

## The 'Other' and the 'Intersubjective' in Dialogue: Reading Krishnamurti and Buber Together

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### Abstract

In the scanty scholarly work available on relating Krishnamurti (1895-1986) and Buber (1878- 1965), their thought is often characterized as ethically and spiritually anti-foundational (Mouzelis, 2010) because they question the authority of any particular religion, sect, philosophy, text and testimony as the basis for determining what is ethical and spiritual. Their emphasis is on basing ethics and spirituality on the relationship-in-the-present rather than remembering and repeating the past. Though they were contemporaries and Krishnamurti traveled extensively, yet there is no reference to their meeting in person or in ideas. However, they come quite close to each other in their philosophizing of the existential reality of human life. Though the terms and concepts that they use are quite different, yet their understanding and approach to human life converge more often than not. Though their place in the literature of philosophy is quite different yet their engagement with life is very much the same.

This paper attempts tentatively to exposit the points of convergence between Krishnamurti and Buber. My entry into the thought of Krishnamurti and Buber is in their assumptions about human being, the intersubjective relation of the subject with the 'other', their understanding of Dialogue and the nature of dialogic relationship.

**KEYWORDS:** Dialogue, Otherness, Buber, Krishnamurti, Intersubjectivity

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### Introduction

The recent movement towards dialogue in many disciplines, like psychology, anthropology, education, philosophy, and hermeneutics has shown how limited the dualistic subject-object understanding is. However, to appreciate these movements one needs to understand the basic assumptions on which these formulations rest. Two such understandings are of Krishnamurti and Buber, which emphasize upon the importance of dialogue to such an extent that they place it at the basis of human existence.

Both Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895- 1986) and Martin Buber (1878- 1965) emphasized the importance of relationships in times which were and probably are marked by extreme violence, hatred, and dehumanization.

They gave us frameworks that held human qualities like love, hope, and compassion in their highest regard. They pointed towards the potential of growth and essential goodness of humans but not without understanding our dehumanizing and violent tendencies.

Krishnamurti engaged in dialogues about the prominent issues and concerns of his times-such as, violence, psychological change and revolution, the nature of mind and thought, meditation, knowledge and inquiry, and human relationships- in public and also with many eminent thinkers like, David Bohm(1999), Alan Anderson (1991), and with Buddhist Scholars like WalpolaRahula and IrmgardSchloegl(Skitt, 2003). His publicspeeches, discussions, and dialogues are available to us in the form of seventeen volumes of his collected works, and we find some of his personal reflections (Krishnamurti, 1987/ 2009), journal (1982/ 2008), and diary entries(2003) as separate works.

Buberpublished his magnum opus 'I and Thou' in 1923, in which he presented his dialogical thought in the most precise almost poetic form. His later works seem more like an elaboration of his dialogical thought presented in this slim book. 'I and Thou' that has acclaimed international recognition and has been translated into many languages. Buber himself has been one of the key thinkers to be studied in the disciplines of psychology, philosophy, anthropology, theology, Jewish studies, sociology, and education. His other works include 'Paths in Utopia' (1958)(concerning communism), 'Between Man and Man' (2002)(collected essays on Dialogue, Education, Existence, and Being Human), 'The Way of Man: According to the Teachings of Hasidism,' (1960)(Hasidic writing), 'Daniel: Dialogues on Realization'(1964) (Drama), and Autobiographical Fragments(1967).

The experience of living in a world that witnessed holocaust and growing up in an intellectual ethos rich with the ideas of thinkers like Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, influenced Buber. He assimilated the ideas of many other thinkers like Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Sartre(e.g. see Buber, 2002). He also had correspondence and dialogue with many contemporary thinkers like Einstein, Camus, Jung, Rogers, Kafka, Tillich, Franz Rosenzweig, and Levinas(Buber, 1991). A fascinating collection of more than forty thousand such letters is available at 'Martin Buber Archives' at the Jewish National and University library, Jerusalem.

Krishnamurti and Buber have many similarities andthere are studies which perceive them in a similar frame of reference in the discipline of education (Smith & Knapp, 2010), psychotherapy (Feltham, 1995), (Cortright, 1997), and spirituality (Vardey, 1995). However, there is only scanty scholarly workavailable on relating their thought and perspective.In the studies that attempt to relate them, their thought is often characterized as ethically and spiritually anti-foundational(Mouzelis, 2010).This is because

they question the authority of any particular religion, sect, philosophy, text and testimony as the basis for determining what is ethical and spiritual. Their emphasis is on basing ethics and spirituality on the relationship-in-the-present rather than on logic alone. Though they were contemporaries and Krishnamurti traveled extensively, yet there is no reference to their meeting in person or in ideas. However, they come quite close to each other in their philosophizing of the existential reality of human life. Though the terms and concepts that they use are quite different, yet their understanding and approach to human life converge more often than not. Though they are placed differently in the philosophical scenario, since Krishnamurti “is acclaimed as the most important contemporary thinker (though not a professional philosopher)” (Agrawal, 1991, p. 4) and Buber has been acknowledged as a professional philosopher and especially in the discipline of philosophical anthropology, yet their engagement with life is very much the same.

However, one does not find Krishnamurti being discussed or taught in a philosophy course since he did not systematize his ideas in the categories of western philosophy i.e. Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Axiology. Similarly, Buber himself evades the label of being a philosopher and prefers to call himself a ‘philosophical anthropologist’. However, when one is able to have dialogue with them, one realizes and appreciates the power of their ideas and their philosophical richness.

This paper attempts to bring out the points of convergence and divergence between Krishnamurti and Buber. Since to understand ‘dialogue’ one needs to understand the basic assumptions about human being, the intersubjective relation of the subject with the ‘other’, the understanding of the dialogical relationship, and about knowledge and knowing, therefore these are my entry points into the thought of Krishnamurti and Buber.

### **Assumptions about the Human Being**

Both Krishnamurti and Buber hold the belief that humans are complete and whole beings. Therefore, any attempt to know human nature or experience based on analytic categories is fundamentally reductionist in nature and amounts to an act of violence to the *being* of humans.

Krishnamurti emphasizes an ‘individual’ who is undivided, indivisible and whole, one who is rooted in a genuine relationship with the ‘other’, as opposed to a conceptualization of an individual in isolation. Human beings live in relationship and there can be no human life without relationships. This human being, who is universally related with others, is different from an individual who “is a local entity, living in a particular culture, particular society, particular religion” (Krishnamurti, 2003, p. 6). There is a basic divide between two individuals but there is a mutual relationship between two persons.

Similarly, for Buber, “in the beginning is relation” (2004, p. 18). According to him “every human being “is born with a given disposition of ‘world-historical’ origin, that is, inherited from the riches of the whole human race, and that he is born into a given situation of ‘world-historical’ origin, that is, produced from the riches of the world’s events” (Buber, 2002, p. 98). Thus, the subject of Buber is not an ‘individual’, separate from the world and other human beings but, a ‘person’ who is affected by the world and in turn affects the world. This person is in relation with others and is thereby defined by the other. The realm of relationships has a primacy over ‘I’ and our sense of ‘I’ is derived from the relationships we enter into. Buber differentiates between an orienting man- one who is interested in the use of objects, and a realizing man- one who realizes the relation with others. “All life experience is a dream of unification; orientation divides and sunders it, realization accomplishes and proclaims it. Thus all reality is fulfilled unification. Nothing individual is real in itself; everything individual is only perception” (Buber, 1964, p. 42). This primacy of relation in both Krishnamurti’s and Buber’s formulations makes one immensely responsible. This sense of ‘being responsible’ “implies responsibility for everything”, which is different from any ‘responsibility for’ which “implies direction, a directed will” (Krishnamurti & Anderson, 1991, p. 54). Because of the interrelatedness with others we, as human beings, “are totally responsible for the whole state of the world” (Krishnamurti, 2003, p. 8). Everyone is responsible for everyone else’s joy and suffering.

This sense of responsibility does not mean that man is bound or not free. Freedom for Buber is therefore a possibility to be in communion with others, a choice to act spontaneously in new and unique ways, a springboard to be used to reach up to the level of communion rather than an aim in itself. It is not just freedom-from but also freedom-of and freedom-to but, with responsibility. This freedom is in relation with and having responsibility towards the ‘other’. In opposition to communion is compulsion where stands an ‘unfree’ person who is defined by public opinion, social status or his own problems that he cannot be spontaneous and mutual with others, he reacts to others instead of responding from his whole being.

### **Relating with the ‘other’**

For both Krishnamurti and Buber the ‘intersubjective’ is at the center of our lives by emphasizing the realm of relationships as essential to human existence. Buber says “Dialogue between mere individuals is only a sketch, only in dialogue between persons is the sketch filled in” (2002, p. 24). The mechanical life of a positivist or the reasoned life of a rationalist would be considered as colorless and hence, would have a limited place in the realm of dialogue.

On the other hand, the phenomenological experience encloses the subject-object division in Krishnamurti's thought. The subject-object division is illusory and would defeat dialogical relation. The 'self' comprises of sensations that are interpreted and find a symbolic representation in 'thought'. These sensations appear to be coherent to us because they get stored in our memory temporally and thus give us an illusion of linearity in context and time. This core of thought and memory also gives us an illusion that we are separate from others, and that we have a unique past and will have a unique future.

Further reflecting on this theme Krishnamurti says the brain stores an image of a sensation as memory and the 'thought' uses this image while interacting with similar sensations. This image-formation is important for the thought because it helps in making sense of the world around us by creating an appearance of distance between the observer and the observed; the thought and the thinker. Thought does this division, classification, experience and image-making in an attempt to seek the familiar, constant and predictable. Further, in an attempt to seek the familiar, thought takes recourse to knowledge of the theories, perspectives, interpretations, traditions and the like.

Knowledge, in this way, is constituted only of past whereas the present *is* and to live in the past is to betray the present. The present is in the confrontation because when one is confronted with 'what is' one acts, but when one is "concerned with theories and speculations and beliefs" (Krishnamurti & Anderson, 1991, p. 22) one never acts. The knowledge as a mechanical function is necessary but, the present is there only when one leaves the past aside in complete attention and enters into a direct relationship with the other.

Buber proposes that the relationship with the other is prior to the sense of 'I' and the relationship that one has with the 'other' defines the 'I'. The way we conceptualize 'I' is twofold in accordance with the twofold attitude of man i.e. 'I-It' and 'I-Thou' (Buber, I and Thou, 2004). When the relationship is characterized by an intention of use, experience, manipulation, measuring, objectification, control and enjoyment, it is a relationship between an 'I' and 'It'. However, if the relationship is characterized by mutuality, spontaneity, openness and directness, then it is a relationship between 'I' and 'Thou'. A free 'person' enters into a relation of person to person, of subject to subject, of reciprocity involving 'meeting' or 'encounter', an 'I-Thou' relation with the whole being; whereas an 'individual' enters into an 'I-It' relation without his whole being. However, being a person or an individual is not a matter of polar choice "but there are men so defined by person that they may be called persons, and men so defined by individuality that they may be called individuals" (Buber, 2004, p. 65). The 'I-It' relation is the way of non-dialogue in which everything is to be consumed, assimilated and

subsumed in the 'I'. It is nevertheless, very important for our survival because in this realm that we do things like use instruments, eat and earn a living. Though Buber differentiates between the realm of dialogue 'I-Thou' and non-dialogue 'I-It', yet these two realms are not completely dissociated but are in a reciprocal relation with each other.

Thus, we can see that both Krishnamurti and Buber present human beings fundamentally in relationships with one another and not in isolation or solitude. Their emphasis on the relational aspect is opposed to the solipsistic conception of man like in the thought of Descartes who conceptualized man essentially as an individual separate from others. The 'other', here, is considered either as a construction of the self or else, the other is assimilated, consumed and hence negated in the self.

### **Dialogue**

The relationship with others, accompanied by the immense sense of responsibility, is based in love. "Love is not thought. Love is not desire, love is not pleasure, love is not the movement of images, and as long as you have images about another, there is no love" (Krishnamurti, 1992, p. 11). This state of relatedness that is not mediated by any image or thought is 'dialogue'. In Krishnamurti's thought (1967, p. 3), a genuine dialogue is one in which "one listens and therefore learns, only in a state of attention, a state of silence in which this whole background (of sequential thought) is in abeyance, is quiet; then... it is possible to communicate". Krishnamurti's conception of dialogical relation requires giving complete attention to the 'other' where there is no subject-object distinction. Any such distinction implies that there is a subject who experiences the object, and thus experience is always in the past. Krishnamurti's dialogue also entails a complete silencing of the accumulated thought so that the relationship with the 'other' remains immediate. Love and dialogue can happen only when thought stops interfering in the relationship with the 'other'; otherwise thought, through the distinctions keeps on objectifying the 'other' in the form of one image or the other. When our relationship is mediated by an image, then no genuine relationship exists because the image is the construction of my thought and the relationship that gets established is between one image and the other. The real dialogue is more than what can be expressed and shared in words and since "the word isn't the thing, the description isn't the described" (Krishnamurti & Anderson, 1991, p. 15), one needs to see the 'other' in his genuineness and 'otherness' without attempting to assimilate it into the 'I'.

To have an openness of dialogue is different from a 'desire' to have a dialogue, since desire entails consumption at its root. The feelings of pleasure, ecstasy and fulfillment do not connote that the dialogue actually happened because these feelings can only be seen and named in the past but dialogue is the present which is marked by love and compassion for the other. "it is not a question of understanding love (or dialogue), but of

understanding all those things in which we are trapped which militate against any possibility of love (or dialogue) whatsoever” (Krishnamurti & Anderson, 1991, p. 66).

The radical otherness of the other is something ungraspable, unapproachable, incomprehensible, and unknowable, which is beyond the control of the ‘I’. Krishnamurti’s uses of the terms like ‘god’ ‘otherness’, ‘real’, ‘unknown’, ‘vast’ and ‘truth’ have a commonality of being incompletely known. However, in the attempt to capture or comprehend the other, thought indulges into the processes of rejection, choosing, classifying, recognizing etc. Here, for Krishnamurti “the conceptualized experience can be called ‘thought’” (Agrawal, 1991, p. 88), that is a barrier in the dialogical communication.

In Buber’s thought, dialogue can be established only in an ‘I-Thou’ relation which is marked by spontaneity, openness, love and mutuality. Buber introduced several terms for describing the realm of dialogue such as the ‘essential relation’, and the ‘between’ with the emphasis on the primacy of interrelation in the human existence. In dialogue, persons turn toward each other in their whole ‘being’ and accept each other as partners in dialogue, irrespective of their positions. In a dialogue where two persons encounter each other, they share a ‘sphere of between’. The dialogical is the unfolding of this sphere. The essence and meaning of dialogue is not in one or the other partner but in the ‘interchange’. Dialogue is characterized by exclusiveness towards the other in the ‘relation’ and every objectification of the ‘other’ is violence to the other’s otherness. Any attempt to comprehend the ‘other’ in its entirety is bound to fail because it entails a loss of otherness of the ‘other’. Dialogue means acceptance of the otherness of the ‘other’. It is like the lover who loves his beloved in her otherness, her independence, her reality, without an attempt to either assimilate her in his being or to make her self-same. He acknowledges it as a ‘fact’ that she is the ‘other’. This acknowledgement of the other is there even in the contradiction and conflict with her.

In a similar vein Krishnamurti considers love as the spirit of the relationship between a man and a woman; love is at the root of all meetings whether they be communicative, physical or emotional. However, if love is not there then, marriage is more like a contract between two people for the fulfilment of their needs and desires. Without love, the relationship between life partners usually gets reduced to the images that they have of each other rather than on a real communication and relating with each other, which converts the relationship into a burden or a summation of daily chores and rituals. For a living relationship there has to be a living love between the partners or in other words dialogue is important. The ‘other’ must not be reduced to an image or an entity.

According to Buber (2002, p. 22) there are three kinds of dialogue: There is 'genuine dialogue'- no matter whether spoken or silent- each of the participants faces the other in their whole being. They turn to each other with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation. Then, there is 'technical dialogue'- which is prompted solely by the need of objective understanding. And third is 'monologue disguised as dialogue', in which two or more men meeting in a space speaks with themselves in intricate and circular ways and yet imagine they have been able to have a dialogue with the other.

The nature of dialogue may also change with the nature of relationship in which the dialogue is happening. Two aspects that make various kinds of dialogic relations different are 'mutuality' and 'inclusion'. Mutuality is there when partners turn to each other in wholeness. The act of 'inclusion' is that which makes it possible to meet and know the other in his concrete uniqueness and not just as a content of one's experience. In a genuine dialogue between friends there is complete mutuality and complete inclusion. Whereas there are two other dialogical relationships that differ in their nature like for example, when two persons are debating over a point they may realize the shortcomings of their own perspective spontaneously: this kind of dialogical relation is 'disputation'. Disputation is abstract because it leaves the wholeness outside the relationship, but it may have a mutual experience of inclusion. Secondly, like in education where 'mutuality' is there but there is one sided experience of inclusion which is the inclusion of the child by the educator. The third kind of dialogue is friendship which has mutuality as well as inclusion by both the partners. In 'I-Thou' helping relationships—those of educator and pupil, parent and child, doctor and patient—this experiencing of the other side cannot be expected to be mutual without destroying the relationship or converting it into friendship.

Where Krishnamurti does not give any such classification of dialogue and probably would not consider disputation and unequal relationships as non-dialogical by the virtue of the fact that these are being mediated by thought and images, Buber on the other hand is probably focused on the meeting of two persons that has the potential of changing their *beings*. Moreover, where in Buber's thought the being has continuity and historicity, which defines the persons, in Krishnamurti's thought, on the other hand, the divisions between the Being and the 'I', and between 'I' and the other are boundaries that need to be dissolved for dialogue.

### **Knowledge and Knowing**

Nevertheless, both Krishnamurti and Buber believed that only through dialogue can one really know. Though one may have information about various facts and theories yet for a complete knowing one needs to enter into dialogue with others. For both of them, this complete knowing only

can give freedom and not the 'desire to be free' or the 'attempts to be free'.

The fundamental question that is at the center of the anti-foundational thought and skepticism of Krishnamurti is

“whether the mind, which is conditioned to structure its experience on the basis of categories it has stored and to think through the medium of theories it has learned and beliefs it has accumulated, can escape from all of this conditioning in a way that is conducive to discovering the truth” (Martin, 2003, p. 16).

As long as the mind is within the structures of thought and experiences, it cannot be engaged in the process of *knowing*, which is in the present, but would only be in the past. This past is very well organized by the intellect but as Krishnamurti (2003, p. 12) puts it “intellect is not the whole field of existence; it is a fragment, and a fragment, however cleverly put together, however, ancient and traditional, is still a small part of existence whereas we have to deal with the totality of life”. This wholeness of experience is present only in dialogue, where there is no knowledge but only knowing with one's completely open mind and full attention.

Buber distinguishes between three ways in which we perceive the world. The first is being and observer, in which “the *observer* is wholly intent on fixing the observed man in his mind, on “noting” him’ (Buber, 2002, p. 10). The focus here is on the characteristics, traits, gestures and expressions of the ‘other’. Here the ‘other’ is fragmented and converted into an object. Second, “the *onlooker* is not at all intent. He takes up the position which lets him see the object freely, and undisturbed awaits what will be presented to him” (Buber, 2002, p. 10). Unlike the observer, the onlooker does not note anything and attempts to memorize anything. However, the ‘other’ does not also pose any responsibility nor demands any action on the part of the onlooker. For Buber (2002, p. 12), the third way of perception is “*becoming aware*”. In this way of perception the ‘other’ addresses *me*, makes *me* responsible for him, and demands an action borne out of a sense of responsibility. Moreover, all this happens without literally speaking anything. The ‘other’, whether it is a human being, an animal, a plant, or an inanimate stone, who says in this way to me cannot be objectified, defined, or categorized. Becoming aware here is what comes closest to the process of *knowing* whereas being an observer and an onlooker will certainly give us certain facts and images which will be in the realm of the ‘I-It’ of knowledge. Buber even restricted the use of the term ‘philosophical’ to refer to the ‘I-It’ realm of knowledge since philosophy is mainly rational and it cannot go beyond itself. This is probably the oppressive aspect of reason that it does not acknowledge anything apart from itself as valid.

Buber like many other existentialists rejected the subject-object dualism as a sufficient starting point of knowledge. For Buber knowing the 'other' as an object is only one aspect of knowing which is a form of the 'I-It' relation. "At the I-It level, the term 'knowledge' describes the relationship between the beliefs in our mind and the objects in the external world... This is the way the term 'knowledge' is usually understood in modern epistemology. Yet, at the level of the I-Thou experience, I think Buber would allow that we have 'knowledge' of the I-Thou experience too" (Sweetman, 2001, p. 150). Even though, this knowledge may not be available to us in the form of propositions and this knowledge may not be symbolically represented in its entirety i.e. articulated completely in any form of symbol, but, nevertheless it is a part of the 'being' of the person. Similarly, the primary meaning of the word for 'knowledge' in Hebrew is *isyeda*, which is related to contact and relation. From this perspective, knowledge is gained in a relation or intimate contact with the 'other'. This knowledge comes from the encounter with the 'other' as 'thou'. This realm of relationship with 'thou' is one where the primal origin of knowledge is. Where the eternal form of art confronts man and asks him to manifest it in a form, and then when it is expressed in some form by human hands, it is in front of the world to be enjoyed and cherished. The form becomes an 'It'. But rarely it does happen that for someone this form becomes a 'thou' which again, through a creative transformation, manifests itself in some new form. "It would, however, be a mistake to assume that Buber underrated the importance of rigorous scholarship or that he rejected the ways of science. He merely refused to regard these as the ultimate values and exclusive tools of learning" (Cohen, 1983, p. 12). Buber never says that knowledge in the 'I-It' relation is not important, in fact "it is possible to live in the bare past, indeed only in it may a life be organized" (2004, p. 32) but he does stress upon the necessity of both in the life of humans.

Here, we can see that both Krishnamurti and Buber acknowledge that knowledge through reason is limited and one can know beyond this limit of reason. However, how one knows beyond the limit cannot be put into words, since words are themselves limited within reason, but it can be experienced in a dialogic encounter.

### **Concluding Remarks**

While reading Krishnamurti and Buber together, one finds that there are overwhelming similarities in their thought, especially in their understanding of dialogue, but there are also some divergences. These points of convergence and divergence are discussed below:

They both distinguish between the realm of dialogue and non-dialogue. The realm of non-dialogue is limited, restricted and definitive whereas the realm of dialogue is unlimited, open, and indefinite. Dialogue entails acknowledgement of the other's otherness and a negation of any attempt

to grasp this otherness. Negation in this sense, leads us positively toward the direction of dialogue. Their conceptualizations present to us a critique of the emphasis given on subject-object distinction, sensory experience, excessive reliance on reason and the pragmatic conceptualization of education as limited to the realm of non-dialogue.

In the formulations of both Krishnamurti and Buber, the realm of dialogue exists before the realm of non-dialogue. Taking the example of an infant who does not have an 'I', which is conceptualized by the thought, we can locate the relationship between the mother and the infant in the realm of dialogue. However, as the infant develops a conceptualized 'I', he moves away from this realm and a space appears between the infant and the mother. Though this distancing results in a non-dialogical relation but it is essential as this enables an awareness of the dialogical relation. This movement to the realm of non-dialogue is essential as it enables one to carry out the negating acts which are important for survival of the human being. Moreover, the dual movement of distance and relation are crucial as it is only in the awareness of the dialogical relation that one recognizes the love, compassion and communion in which the humans dwell.

Both Krishnamurti and Buber discuss dialogue in reference to material 'other', human 'other' and natural 'other', and the radical 'other' as God. Krishnamurti understands dialogue, firstly, in inquiry- where one acts with a lot of skepticism and questions the established foundations of the other's and one's own thinking, and secondly, in the relationship with the other beings, whether animate or inanimate, where one meets the other holistically, in the wholeness of the being. Here his emphasis is on 'critical looking' which is holistic and immediate rather than on 'critical thinking' which is mediated, based only in reason and thus fragmentary.

Similarly, Buber distinguishes between three spheres in which the world of relation arises which are our life with nature, with men and with intelligible forms. However, the elaborate distinction and differences that Buber outlines between humans in three different contexts: i.e. in disputation, in educative relationships, and in friendship, is not visible in Krishnamurti's conceptualization of dialogue.

When we talk about 'dialogue', the form of dialogue that comes readily to our mind is 'Socratic Dialogue' which, in the light of the understandings from Krishnamurti and Buber, seems to be more of a 'discussion' or 'debate', which Buber calls as 'disputation'- the one in which mutuality is there but not inclusion of the other. "It is not when students are asked 'Socratic' questions, and encouraged to participate in an orderly discussion" (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 73), but it is in the encounter that dialogue happens. Moreover, Krishnamurti's and Buber's understanding of dialogue inherently has the involvement of the whole being whereas the 'Socratic' questioning seems to be more of rhetoric focusing only on 'thinking' presented in a literary form.

Krishnamurti and Buber present to us the understanding that the notion of time and space is created by the thought and this division can be overcome in the present, in the immediate, in the dialogue. Moreover, “While purporting to save us from the anxiety of uncertainty and risk, objectivistic thought actually perpetuates the very alienation and solitude from which we seek to flee” (Kakkattuthadathil, 2001, p. 114). Though the thought in itself cannot go beyond the realm of time and space and the ‘other’ is beyond comprehension and beyond description, yet in the immediate encounter, in the present, the mind can *know* the ‘other’.

They both present relationship as an ontological reality and at the very core of being human. Moreover, If the dialogical relationships, like the ‘I-thou’ relation, cannot be fully conceptualized, then the spirit of such a relation, probably, can only be intuited, but even in being intuited it enters into the realm of reason. However, there are certain questions that remain unanswered like, how does dialogue happen without thought? What kind of communication, knowing, looking, or perception can take place without thinking and/ or thought? Are these questions better left unanswered since they are in the realm of reason, which we are claiming to be a hindrance in a dialogical relation? Nevertheless, they do accept rational knowledge as valid even though it has its own limitations, which need to be acknowledged.

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