

Heidegger's account of *Intentionality as an involvement*

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Abstract

The objective of my paper is to trace the significance of Heidegger's account of Intentionality. Intentionality as explained is always an engagement rather than just a mere cognitive exercise. My attempt in this paper is to basically focus on his structure of intentionality, which is not something which can be given static definition but intentionality is already being involved in the world. Though Heidegger has not explicitly used the term intentionality in his magnum opus *Being and time* I will argue that he has implicitly referred to intentionality through his explanation of structure of *care* in terms of *by being-towards*.

Introduction:

Heidegger belongs to phenomenological tradition where has set a new ground concerning the method of 'intentionality'. It was seen that earlier philosophers has given a very submissive account of 'being' because it no longer seriously interrogates its concepts and assumptions. He states in *Being and time* that the history of philosophy should be re-interrogated to find a more promising philosophy. For Heidegger, Phenomenology is used as a method to be applied in an access to being; but it is not in a detached manner or descriptive analysis of consciousness as other philosophers did. The question of being in the tradition was taken for granted which is restated in Heideggarian terminology. Metaphysics and Ontology both inquires into the question of being but the tradition of Metaphysics is more concerned about the nature of being, where the question of being as such is disregarded and *being* itself is obliterated. Heidegger being uncomfortable with the understanding of being tries to reformulate a new theory in quest for meaning of being. This paper involves three sections - in the *first section* I will deal with the issue of intentionality, here I will try to explain the concept intentionality and how it differs among the philosophers within the same tradition: Brentano, Husserl. Here I will discuss Husserl in an extensive way to set a ground in understanding intentionality and what led a shift to Heidegger's thought. In the *second section* I will focus on the significance of intentionality in Heidegger's sense. Here I will discuss the structure of intentionality where I will focus on the structure of care as understanding his theory of intentionality. In the *third section* I will discuss the significance of Heidegger's intentionality in explaining that the most significant feature of intentionality is *for the sake of*, there is always an involvement with entities and others in the world. I will be concerned with the significance of Heidegger's phenomenology to the phenomenological stream for creating a new dimension of thought.

1. The Nature of Intentionality:

The concept of intentionality has been defined and developed throughout history of philosophy but it regained forces primarily through the works of Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl and , Martin Heidegger. Intentionality is a technical term in philosophy which is a characteristic feature of mental states and experiences in what we commonly call as *being conscious* or *being aware of*. In the broad sense, intentionality can be defined as the ‘*aboutness*’ or *directedness* of one’s mental states or acts. Mental states always have content and are always about something. For instance: whenever one thinks, he thinks about something, he hopes, believes or denies is of something in reference to some objective content or anything which is present in the outside world. Whenever I see a book; my perception is a perception of a book, this state of experience is in this way a representation of something other than itself and so it gives one a sense of something. The representation character of mind, its being of or about something is intentionality. Even when the mental state is not necessarily real, it remains to certain extent objective- if we are thinking of Pegasus one is thinking only in reference to something even if it is not objectively present.

Phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experiences ranging from perception, thought, memory; imagination, emotion, desire, volition to bodily awareness, embodied action and social activity including linguistic activity.¹ All these structures are explained through intentionality that is the directedness of experiences towards things in the world. In other words, Phenomenological tradition basically deals in studying the structure of consciousness or the content of consciousness from a first-person point of view. It tries to study the consciousness in terms of what form it takes and its significant feature of intentionality, how consciousness is directed or refers to things. Phenomenological characterization does not aim at suggesting either a causal or reductive explanation of consciousness. But it aims at giving a highly descriptive nature of intentionality. Phenomenology is a descriptive enterprise, it is necessary to provide a careful description of what perception is to attend to the thing-in-themselves in terms of what appears to us is the basic reality to be understood in the truest sense. It shows an analysis of clearer idea one can get through, not just an explanation because it does not employ any causal laws to explain the existence of things. It is not to be taken as a factual enquiry but to uncover what belongs to it essentially as a thing of that kind.² It is concerned with the study of experience of entities not entities directly of the natural sciences. It is more of attending to how a thing is given in that experience?

Both Husserl and Brentano come to the understanding of experience from the role of intentional in experience. Husserl makes important modifications in Brentano’s account of intentionality which determine the character of his conception of experience. Heidegger gave a radically new account of intentionality which though undermines the subjectivists’ tendency implicit in both Brentano and Husserl’s account

¹ Schroeder William .R, *Continental Philosophy: A Critical Approach* p.174

² Crowell Steven, *Husserlian Phenomenology* p.10

of experience. Here I will try to discuss the structure of intentionality in Brentano, and how Husserl derived the notion from him but in a different manner.

1.1 Brentano on Intentionality:

Here I have not dealt broadly with Brentano but I have just mentioned some of the points which depict his nature of explaining intentionality, he laid too much emphasis on the mental phenomena to be mental acts only and this led to transition in the thought of Husserl.

Brentano is probably best known for having introduced the notion of intentionality to contemporary philosophy. Brentano gives an introspective account of describing consciousness as inner perception which is different from inner observation and extended that philosophy should be done away with exact methods used by natural sciences. He asserted that intentionality is the mark of the mental; it is only the characteristic of the psychological phenomena which explains that it is only presence of intentionality which could be distinguished from the physical phenomena. He gave an empirical approach, and describes what one directly experiences are inner-perception from an empirical standpoint which means what one directly experiences in inner perception from a first person perspective. Every mental phenomenon includes something as an object within itself, contains an objective within itself. He believes that every mental phenomenon is *intentional in existence of an object*³, it has an object within itself and there is no necessity whether there exists an object independent on me. Mental phenomena are always directed inwardly. Brentano gave the idea of intentionality whereby mental acts are directed at or refer to themselves. There has to be a need of inner perception, there cannot be any unconscious mental act we are aware of each mental act occurring as every mental as directed towards itself. The intentional object towards which we are directed is the part of the psychological act. He makes a strong claim considering that there cannot be any unconscious mental acts. It is incidentally however directed towards itself as a secondary object. He has distinguished between intentional object and the actual object. He seems to have said that we are directed to the object in intention and if there is no intended act there is no object. He gives priority to the subjective realm, independent of the objective realm. Ontological status of the intentional act was left unanswered.

1.2 Husserl on Intentionality:

Husserl was impressed by the idea that intentionality is always directed or is about something. He conceives that cognitive acts are not mental items but are the truth-bearers.⁴ Intentionality is not to be taken as just static presence of something which is presented but it is more of an engaging act of something.

In saying a mental experience to be intentional is to say that it is of something that it refers to something. But this reference is not to be taken as a simple relation between the act and the object because there are *objectless presentations*⁵ where there is intentional

³ <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/brentano>

⁴ Crowell Steven, *Husserlian Phenomenology* p.13

⁵ McIntyre Ronald and Smith David Woodruff, *Theory of Intentionality* p.5

directedness without an object. Husserl disagrees with Brentano's account regarding all experiences are intentional because there are mental phenomena which are not intentional. One can be sure only of the mental states what is happening inside one's brain not to the outside world. Husserl tried to liberate our concern for knowing the world, the study relegated how what we know but concentrated on how do we know? How do we make sense of what we claim to know? How do we have the experience of something outside us? Husserl sets up an idea that phenomenology would provide a firm basis in order to know or study the meaning in the world. Meaning is not given but it is an activity to make sense of the meaning.

To give an explanation regarding how do we know the world I have explained the act of awareness, inseparability between subject and object in the process of knowing, the revelation of *noema* through the act of *noesis* within the *hORIZONS* in terms of Husserl.

In trying to know the meaning of the world we are targeting the sense of, how do we understand the things in the world. For Husserl there are no mere appearances, every appearances are real and they belong to the being of the thing which is encountered. Phenomenology attempts to get at the truth of the matters to describe how to get at thing-in-themselves, in which it appears itself to the consciousness. Husserl took a pre-supposition less entry to study the phenomena or the '*edios*' of the object without being bogged down by the suppositions beforehand. He stated that all dogmatism and a priori metaphysical premises of earlier accounts in nature of knowledge should be suspended. It was seen that the philosophical attempt to explain the nature of the world fails because either it gets carried out by extreme solipicism or it get unnoticed through ideas and impressions. Earlier it was seen that object was laid much stress on in order to receive knowledge, it was believed that we need to directly attend to the things independent of us to grasp the knowledge of the thing. Later Locke, studied that knowledge is that which has an inner mental representation or copy of what exists outside the mind. Husserl gave a new ground of understanding the phenomena of being in the truest sense as what it appears to the things-in-themselves. He mostly stressed on the act of knowing by giving an inseparable ground to subject and object, the experience of engaging directly with the world in order to know it's being. Husserl asserted that there is no world existing bereft of my existence, or prior to my experience. Everything existing in the world or the things knowledgeable to me is through me but not me along rather, in terms of acting because of the presence of the world. In order to answer the question of how we can have knowledge of the world, we ought to turn our attention to the study of our experience of it and the structure of the forms of experience which involves directedness towards the things in the world.

(a) Inseparability of subject and object

Husserl argued that scientific method was delusional and gave a passive observation; indeed we must turn our attention to the object of experience. He believes that there is an inseparable link between the subject and the object and a need to study the act of consciousness through which the nature of thing-in-themselves is important. Act of awareness is taken as an act, an activity, where in terms of doing I am acting. As I perform I know that I am acting. Consciousness is not to be taken as substance like that of Descartes, it is not nameable but is an act of awareness. One must not take perception

as passively registering of things to the mind but it is rather an activity where our engagement is important. We were often said that when we are conscious we are primarily aware of ourselves. Consciousness was taken as a bubble or an enclosed cabinet, the mind comes in box. Impressions and concepts occur in this enclosed space in this circle of ideas and experiences. Our awareness is directed towards them and not directly towards the things outside, which shows that we can be sure of our mental states only and not that which is outside us. Phenomenology's interest is to break *the ego-centric predicament*.⁶ It is a necessary exercise in which direction is towards the things-themselves not something which is only in mind. It shows that mind is a public thing which acts and manifests itself out in the open not just inside its own confinement. The mind and world are correlated with one another where things do appear to us, they just do not exist but manifests themselves as what they are. For instance when I see a tree, I see only from one perspective, I intend even the sides that are hidden. The presently visible sides are surrounded by innumerable potentially invisible sides where the absence is also a part of my experience. All experiences involve a blend of presence and absence. When we say that a square is presented to us means it is given to us with culmination of both presented and not presented sides, the identity is given to us that the other sides will be in certain way. *Consciousness is of something in the sense that it intends the identity of the objects not just the flow of appearances that is presented to us.*⁷ In the act of consciousness we are not only aware of the thing but also its non-thing, which is presented to us in form of identity. The act of knowing cannot be taken as fixed nature of getting things revealed to our consciousness but it is activity of possibilities, it is a claim of expectation, where the act is in flow and is not taken in terms of intervals t1, t2, t3 but unity of open-endedness, not a mere segregation or aggregation but a unity of process of making sense of.

Husserl mentioned that the very act of knowing should not be presupposed with baggages of thought, in order to study the things-in-themselves we need to attend to his method of reduction. He believes that whenever we come in contact with an object we try to grasp the thing with many suppositions and the essential nature of the thing gets hidden. He believed that we need to suspend all the judgments on anything that prevent us from attending to thing-in-themselves. He asserts that the meeting point of consciousness and the act of intentionality and what is intended is called the phenomenon. Many things may be included within my perceptual view of a piece of rock. When I see the rock from a distant, I view it with lots of assumptions and narrations and it comes up with countless possibilities. In order to avoid all forms of conventional opinion, in terms of commonsense psychology, all metaphysical theorizing regarding the nature of intentional must be suspended. He used the term *epoche*⁸, it is not negation but dislocation from or *parenthesing* for the moment and not be carried away with the presupposition. He used the method of reduction in three layers:

⁶ Sokolowski Robert *Introduction to Phenomenology* p. 10

⁷ Sokolowski Robert *Introduction to Phenomenology* p. 20

⁸ Sokolowski Robert *Introduction to Phenomenology* p. 49

Phenomenological Reduction: In order to get to the essence of the thing, the mode of direction needs to be suspended, this reduction is about suspending the objective nature whether the world really exists or not independent of me.

Eidetic Reduction: this reduction is performed to let the essence come into view more clearly and anything merely contingent to drop away. This is an exercise of freeing away the psychical aspects that are open to us. It is an attempt to free away even the imaginative variation. Eidetic reduction is about the analysis of essence of the intended act, which is revealed by the structure of *noema* and *noesis*. *Our perceptual act has both noematic and noetic structure in experience*⁹. *Noema* and *noesis* are the correlative parts of structure of mental processes where the *noesis* is the act of intending and *Noema* is that what is thought about. *Noema* is the route through which the object is grasped but it is not the intended object. Even the non-existence of the actual object cannot remove the *noema* from the intending act. It is said that every act has a *noema* not every act has an object. In thinking of *noema* my act has a *noema* but there exists nothing corresponding to its *noema*. Husserl believes that when we grasp an object, we cannot grasp the complete object, the aspects which are not grasped is given in a horizon. *Horizon*¹⁰ is constituted by those aspects of thing that are not given in perception but rather are possibilities which can be given in further reflection which is anticipated in terms of perceiving the object. For instance: when I perceive the conference room of Philosophy Department I anticipate what is behind the door, in terms of my contact with the door which is given in a horizon. Husserl believes that in my perceptual act there is an actual side of the object perceived and also that each act of perception takes place within a horizon of further anticipation in terms of *protention and retention*¹¹. We cannot say that what we perceive is driven only from what is actually perceived in the present but is oriented towards future experiences and also is an experience continuing from past experiences. Phenomenology attempts to concentrate on how things appear rather than what is given to me.

Transcendental reduction: it is a reduction to the realm of pure consciousness and essence of the object. This reduction analyses the sense of the object. The ego should be elevated from give-ness of the world to the level of transcendence, possibility to move beyond the immanence. The subject transcends the ego in understanding the thing as it appears. It is ego that constitutes the act of seeing transcends from the groundedness but still not cease to exist. Ego is embodied and is constituted by the sociality, historicity but still there is a sense of transcendence only then it becomes transparent. Husserl believes that in act of intending, the act is constituted not only merely knowing something but knowing about something, constituted through the ego. It is through experience that the ego is constituted so there is a need to transcend this ego because our experiences shape the ego, so there is a need to transcend the realm of ego to get to thing-in-themselves.

⁹ Cerbone David R. *Understanding Phenomenology* p.28

¹⁰ Cerbone David R. *Understanding Phenomenology* p.29

The three forms of reduction is taken from Robert Soloslowski's *Introduction to Phenomenology* p. 42-51

¹¹ Cerbone David R. *Understanding Phenomenology* p.26

There was a shift in the thought of Heidegger, he was not satisfied with the idea of suspending the object, he does not give any epistemological exercise of how do we know the things but he gave much emphasis on self understanding. For Heidegger intentionality is always practical rather than cognitive relation to the entities in the world. The focus shifted from what shows itself to be seen from itself just as it shows itself. Husserl still sees intentionality primarily as a structure of *consciousness*. Heidegger says we must go beyond this position and question how a *being* is related to its *being intended*; indeed we must question whether we can properly approach the topic in that way at all.

2. Heidegger on Intentionality

Heidegger considered intentionality as an inward moment where the issue is my being-in-the-world. He is concerned with what it is for something to be, being of the being itself? In trying to understand the world, my being is being revealed and it is being impossible to grasp this very *being of beings*¹². Things are not out there in the world apart from human beings, but it refers to the meaningful presence of things to our corresponding needs and interests, whether practical or theoretical. Here the intentionality is directed to study the nature of its own being regarding how am I doing in terms of studying who I am? It is intentionality without an object; something is being directed but still cannot situate this directedness. Heidegger's ultimate *purpose was not to analyze the meaningfulness of things but to move beyond such meaningfulness to X that makes it possible*.¹³ He asserts that the question of being has been misinterpreted and that is where problem lies, it is supposed by the earlier philosophers that being is something which somewhere out there which is not reachable and we can know only what appears. Heidegger claims that, in traditional accounts of intentionality, the 'being' of intentional have been misunderstood as merely present-at-hand something as occurring. *Dasein* as *being-there*, is a necessary feature *which understands itself in understanding the world; of entities encountered in the world*.¹⁴ He believes that Intentionality must be understood in terms of structural features of the *Dasein*, but *Dasein* is already beyond itself, and dwelling in the world among things and not locked in the privacy of its own consciousness. The intentional relation is misunderstood in Cartesian terms as the subject trying to reach out to the object, but it is more of understanding one's self in understanding the entities. Heidegger uses intentionality as a way to understand the *Dasein's* being-in-the-world. The intentional object is never the part of the act; all objects of consciousness are transcendence. Intentionality involves transcendence because the object is never present-at-hand. Human perception always moves beyond what is interpreted, it subsides in anticipation and *protention* on one side as well as *retention* in the other side. No act of consciousness is actually rooted in the presence, it has this temporal nature of grasping different aspects which may change as not only our perceptions shifts from one side to another but also the act itself which looks beyond itself to other aspects and also assumes them in grasping the object. Indeed for Husserl it belonged to the very structure of material objects that they are given to consciousness only in one-sided adumbrations.

¹² Gorner Paul *Heidegger's Being and Time* p.16

¹³ Sheehan Thomas, *The Turn: All Three of Them* p.31

¹⁴ Gorner Paul *Heidegger's Being and Time* p.24

Heidegger criticizes Husserl for overstressing the cognitive aspect of intentionality. Heidegger explained Intentionality in terms of being- towards, a self relating understanding. An intentionality which is directed upon an object is directed upon itself, where *Dasein* is intended as its own as a state of its own. This means that I aim at my ends as mine and this relation extends to all my near and dear things.

Heidegger believes that things are not given disinterestedly, neutrally to our sight as it were, rather things are given as items involved in various tasks and practical engagements. The objects are not given as their own, and not initially attended to the theoretical act. In a way seeing may not be in directedness, it may be the case that I perceive a thing when I was in happy mode and I perceive the same thing when I was in sad mode. Both these mode of access is different and so will the same object appear in different way. We experience things in a fussed sense in an equipmental whole in our every day dealing with the world.¹⁵ We experience things as ready-at-hand or indeed absence etc. For instance I reach for the hammer to put the nail, I always do things in order to do something else. Things appear as use things, as environmental things rather than mere things in the world. Intentionality is taken to be an activity rather than mere conceiving of things out there in the world. Our actions are always purposeful, in hammering the nail my actions aim at a purpose of hanging the picture, hanging the picture because this will make the room beautiful and so on. Intentionality is towards the understanding of being but being is in the world which is does not freezes itself but it has utmost potentiality and because of this possibility it is always aiming towards some fulfillment within *circumspection*¹⁶. Heidegger believes that Husserl's, knowing subject must be replaced by doing subject. He believes that practical ways of dealing with the world is more basic than that of theoretical. For Heidegger human activity plays a role in our constitution of the world in which sense the ego constitutes our act of experience. Intentionality is always practical rather than cognitive and that primary form of intending is doing something for a purpose rather than being conscious of something.

For Husserl the central problem is the problem of constitution: how is the world of phenomena constituted in our consciousness? Instead of focusing on something, it must be given in consciousness in order to be constituted, the prime focus must be on the mode of being of that being in which the world constitutes itself. *Dasein* is that being in which any being is constituted, it is through *Dasein* which Heidegger chooses as the particular entity to access being.

(a) *The structure of Care*

Dasein is essentially temporal (past present, future,) where past and future is inbuilt in the present. Temporality cannot be identified with the ordinary notion of time which of simply being in one point of time to another. Being is in the world, and it is not being taken as spatial understanding but a temporal one. Being is in the world not like an entity but as an ontological reality which always attempts to seek for possibilities and cannot be comprehended as I, because future cannot freeze itself. *Dasein* also exists in midst of beings of entities and that of other *dasien*. Being is always- *ahead of, already in and*

¹⁵ Gorner Paul *Heidegger's Being and Time* p.44

¹⁶ Heidegger Martin. *Being and Time* p.155

*along with*¹⁷. Being is already ahead of being inseparable from myself. Intentionality is objectless, directionless journey because past is already ingrained in the present, but being in the present cannot fix my being because it already ahead of my grasping it. This being is not isolated but located in the world along side of which means that *Dasein* is always caught up in some kind of ongoing activity.

Being is there in a particular way belonging to a particular history for a particular goal. My being is not something ready-to-hand but every activity of *Dasein* is purposeful, in which my being gets disclosed in which my being discloses to myself, it is not something that it is always there ready-to-hand but it comes out with a purpose, and my being is disclosed to me by the activity in which I engage constantly. *Dasein* is always ahead of itself in so far as it is always projecting itself in terms of some projects or for the sake of other projects. Being a student is not merely standing a fact or the static content for me, the way my weight, color could be, nor being student as my goal is out there in future that I might someday reach, or make it as fact. Being a student is neither of these but is something in terms of which I organize my activities and direct those activities.

3. Involvement in the world

Heidegger believes that there is no sense of an ego separate from the operative project. Human life consists of practical projects, with a special task guided by a purpose. Being-in-the-world means thrown into the existing culture with a purpose already in process. This idea of being in the world is taken to be a kind of involvement in the world. Being and world need not be seen in the opposed sense but in a unitary way where my being cannot be detached from the world. I find that Intentionality in Heidegger's sense is taken as an engagement where I am involved in the very act of understanding my projects. *Being is its involvement*.¹⁸ I cannot to freeze myself to understand my being or the being-in-the-world because it is always in process. The entities in the world are either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. *My being is always directed towards the entities in terms of concern and with that of other Dasein in terms of solicitude*.¹⁹ Heidegger appeals to concern and solicitude as fundamental to our being-in-the-world. *Care* shows that thing shows up in terms of mattering to us in various ways even if we find ourselves to be indifferent towards them. When I encounter with the world, the things I experience inheres the stamp of my projects, purposes etc. It means being a student is *for-the-sake-of*²⁰ which a possibility is and to say that I am a student is to say that I am always projecting myself in terms of that possibility. All things that I do preparing my term papers and presentations are subservient to my self-understanding as being a student. There is no particular singular quality which makes me student but my constant projects and goals, it is the possibility in terms of which I understand myself and also others understand me as well. What I am is in no point fixed and determined but something I continually involve myself. My existence involves a structure of 'not yet' within myself and that is why I am uncomfortable with the state I am in and would like to set further goals to give a nature to

¹⁷ Cerbone David R. *Understanding Phenomenology* p.53

¹⁸ Heidegger Martin. *Being and Time* p.116

¹⁹ Cerbone David R. *Understanding Phenomenology* p.51

²⁰ Heidegger Martin. *Being and Time* p.116

my existence. My being is in the world where I am always directed towards the world in terms of understanding, attending to, or picking up possibilities, it is not something which arises present-at-hand outside *Dasein* and meets up with it. But *Dasein* itself shows itself to the world within the world. Being towards the world in which one encounters entities within the world as they look, as they are present-at-hand. There is always a world for the being to dwell with, a bare subject without a world is never there. He believes that mere perception would not be a right activity of understanding the world, where being-in-the-world is the condition of possibility of involvement to any kind of entity. In my encountering with the entities they show themselves, rather than things with their properties, they show in terms of their assignment of use to it. There is no such thing as bare equipment but it is in terms of my use of them. What is first encountered is the library only later the singles are encountered that of books, tables, pens etc. mere looking won't give us the access to the equipment of what it is. It is only in being involved with the equipment, in terms of using the books for studying that the books shows itself as a book. Mere perception is a deficient mode of behavior but this does not prevent us from seeing that engagement has its own sight i.e. circumspection where *I see things in order to of things and its encounter with in order to of other things.*²¹

Being-in the-world is for the sake of something in the sense of being involved and engaged with having to do with equipment ready-to-hand entities. We are inseparable from the world, it is the web of possibilities out of which entities shows themselves or are encountered. Concern is inseparable from the world in the sense of structure in which ready-to-hand shows itself. He does not give emphasis on wordless subject like that of Husserl. Again world is not an entity in itself but it shows us the possible ways for entities. Heidegger concentrated on the significance of whatever we encounter in the world.

Thus, the way Heidegger studied intentionality is much significant than that of Husserl because Husserl elevated both the subject and the object of understanding. In an attempt towards the transcendental reduction, he never studied the actual existence, the sense the things have or in terms of how the meaning is constituted because he bracketed away the embedded-ness of our being in the world. But in Heidegger the significance is given to the embedded-ness in which the being discloses itself in terms of encountering the things and other beings. He elucidates both the way in which humans exists and the way worldly things exists and acknowledges that human exists as well as the things exists, where both are required to be present in the world in order to understand the unconcealed realm. Worldly items are given just as tools for the benefit or interests of human and they are not inert object by meaningfully different in their use.

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²¹ Gorner Paul *Heidegger's Being and Time* p.43

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