

Does Coercive Diplomacy Work Against Developing/Developed Nuclear Weapons States? A Case Study Analysis of the Effectiveness of Coercive Diplomacy against Developing/Developed Nuclear Weapons States

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Abstract

This paper hypothesizes that success/failure of coercive diplomacy in forcing states to abandon developing/developed nuclear weapons greatly depends on regime survival in the target state. The main independent variable of interest is the perception of regime change. Other independent variables are demand, sense of urgency, and credibility of threat. For a thorough understanding of analyses of this paper, it is imperative not to mix credibility of threat with perceptions of regime change. Credibility of threat relates to the capability of the coercer to make a credible threat. The threat might not necessarily focus on regime change in target state in dealing with nuclear weapons program but rather on launching a pre-emptive attack on nuclear sites of the target state. On the other hand, perceptions of regime change relates to the calculations of the target state regarding the motives of the coercer. Coercive diplomacy in dealing with nuclear weapons is more likely to succeed where the regime per se in the target state is not threatened; Libya is a case in point. Whereas, Coercive diplomacy in dealing with nuclear weapons is more likely to fail if coercer threatens and attempts regime change in the target threat, North Korea is a prime example in this case. The dependent variable is success/failure of coercive diplomacy. The target state's decision to forgo developing nuclear weapons is considered a success of coercive diplomacy, while decision to continue developing nuclear program by the target state is measured as a failure of coercive diplomacy.

1. Introduction and Background

The threat of use of force, limited use of force, and economic sanctions have often been employed by some actors in international society aiming at forcefully persuading an opponent to halt or reserve an action which is not inline with the interests of coercers. According to Alexander George coercive diplomacy can take defensive and aggressive forms (1991, p.5). It is imperative to distinguish coercive diplomacy from compellence and deterrence. Paul Huth defines deterrence as the “use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action” (1999, p.26). In other words, Raja Mohan defines deterrence as a type of relationship in which “ an actor- a state, group or an individual- seeks to influence another in many different ways... resting primarily upon threats of sanction or deprivation... indicate to an opponent that the costs of an action by him far outweigh benefits” (1986, p.4).

George in his seminal book “Forceful Persuasion” contends that the “general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of

punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand” (1991, p.4). In other words, coercive diplomacy is a “response to an encroachment already undertaken” and to undue what has already been done (1991, p.5). Thus, deterrence is aimed at preventing a future action, whereas coercive diplomacy is aimed at forgoing an action that is already undertaken.

For George, coercive diplomacy has to be differentiated from compellence, because compellence does not contain both offensive and defensive strategies. As George notes coercive diplomacy is more flexible than compellence. Coercive diplomacy includes diplomacy and accommodation (George, 1991, p.5), whereas compellence concentrates mainly on heavy threats of use of force (Peter Jakobsen, 1998, P64).

Coercive diplomacy has been an integral part of the conduct of international politics. The study of coercive diplomacy can be divided into two groups. First, coercive diplomacy against states that only possess conventional weapons. Some examples of this kind of coercive diplomacy are the Laos crisis of 1961-1962, the failure of United States Air Force to coerce Hanoi in 1965, the Reagan administration’s coercive diplomacy against Nicaragua, the use of coercive diplomacy against terrorism in Libya in 1985, coercive diplomacy in the Persian Gulf crisis and coercive diplomacy against Iraq before 2003 war.

Second, against states which have developed or are developing nuclear weapons. Coercive diplomacy against Libya, North Korea, and Iran are cases in point. This division of coercive diplomacy is imperative and necessary for two main reasons. First, theoretically forceful persuasion of a nuclear or developing nuclear states is likely to be harder than a non-nuclear state because nuclear weapons makes miscalculation difficult and it is clear to everyone what a few numbers of nuclear missiles can do (Kenneth Waltz 2002). Second, security seems to be the main reason for states that have developed or are developing nuclear weapons. Thus, nuclear weapons and survival are inextricable, especially for the second nuclear age states (Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and Iran).

International community, especially great powers, specifically the United States as the most powerful state are very sensitive about nuclear proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency are formed to prevent further proliferation. It is therefore, current nuclear seeking states encounters coercive measures by international community for abandoning their nuclear programs. It is important to examine the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy against nuclear seeking states. This paper inquires into the success and failure of coercive diplomacy in forcing states to forgo developing/developed nuclear weapons. The main question that this paper addresses is: What determines success and failure of coercive diplomacy in forcing states to abandon developing/developed nuclear weapons? Before proceeding the discussion it is important to specify how success or failure of coercive diplomacy is measured. Coercive diplomacy is considered a success if the target state comply with the demands of coercer, without the use of force as the main cause of coercion. On the contrary, coercive diplomacy can be regarded a failure where the coercer launches an all-out attack on the target state or where the coercer fails to force the target state to comply with the demand through the threat of use of force or economic sanctions.

This paper follows a case study methodology. North Korea and Libya are the focus of this paper. Libya is considered a success of coercive diplomacy since Libya complied with the demand in 2003 and abandoned its nuclear program. Whereas, North Korea has consistently and defiantly refused to comply with the demands and so far coercive diplomacy against North Korea has been a failure. The reason for selecting Libya and North Korea is that, these two cases exactly fit the analysis of this paper. Also, due to the lack of similar cases this paper only examines two case studies.

It might be argued that Iran could be included as a failure of coercive diplomacy and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea could be considered as successes of coercive diplomacy. The reason for not considering Iran in this paper is that analyses of North Korea can to a great extent be replicated on Iran. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea cannot be considered as successes of coercive diplomacy because no measures of coercive diplomacy were employed against those countries. Ukraine and Kazakhstan neither possessed the legal ownership of nuclear weapons nor the technical capability of using the weapons. After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine had the third largest strategic nuclear weapons on its soil. Russia as the successor of the former Soviet Union relocated the weapons to Russia without employing any kind of coercive measure against Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In case of South Africa, South Africa abandoned its nuclear weapons without encountering any kind of coercive measures. The new regime, which came to power in early 1990s in South Africa, decided to dismantle its nuclear program. Taiwan and South Korea abandoned their nuclear aspirations without experiencing any kind of coercive measures, in order to preserve the U.S security assurance and nuclear umbrella.

This paper hypothesizes that success/failure of coercive diplomacy in forcing states to abandon developing/developed nuclear weapons greatly depends on regime survival in the target state. The main independent variable of interest is the perception of regime change. Other independent variables are demand, sense of urgency, and credibility of threat. For a thorough understanding of analyses of this paper, it is imperative not to mix credibility of threat with perceptions of regime change. Credibility of threat relates to the capability of the coercer to make a credible threat. The threat might not necessarily focus on regime change in target state in dealing with nuclear weapons program but rather on launching a pre-emptive attack on nuclear sites of the target state. On the other hand, perceptions of regime change relates to the calculations of the target state regarding the motives of the coercer. Coercive diplomacy in dealing with nuclear weapons is more likely to succeed where the regime per se in the target state is not threatened; Libya is a case in point. Whereas, Coercive diplomacy in dealing with nuclear weapons is more likely to fail if coercer threatens and attempts regime change in the target threat, North Korea is a prime example in this case. The dependent variable is success/failure of coercive diplomacy. The target state's decision to forgo developing nuclear weapons is considered a success of coercive diplomacy, while decision to continue developing nuclear program by the target state is measured as a failure of coercive diplomacy.

In analyzing the two case studies and their success/failure, four questions, which are mainly derived from Alexander George's model, will be answered for both cases:

What was demanded from the target state? What incentives were offered? The sending state (s) has to make a clear demand from the target state. The vagueness of the demand decreases the likelihood of success. □

How credible was the threat? The larger the threat of coercion the more the probability of achieving demands. This paper measures credibility through a considerable disparity in military might between the sender and the target states in favor of the sender and the past behavior of the sender in settling international crisis. □

How was the sense of urgency for compliance created? This paper measures sense of urgency by examining the internal political and economic conditions of the target state. □

Was the regime in target state threatened? The threat of regime change is measured by explicit statement from the sender against the target state or perceptions of regime change by the target state. □

For determining the success and failure of the two cases, the above questions are thoroughly analyzed and concluding remarks are provided in referring to the research question and hypothesis.

2. Coercive Diplomacy Against Libya's nuclear program 1990-2003 Chronology and Background

Before getting into coercive measures targeted at Libyan nuclear weapons, a brief background of Libya's nuclear program is necessary. In spite of Libya's membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty from 1975 and joining the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from 1982, Libya was believed to pursue various types of Weapons of Mass Destruction programs, including nuclear weapons program beginning in the 1970s (Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti 2011). Libya under Gadhafi made some unsuccessful attempts for acquiring working nuclear weapons from nuclear states. The first Libya's unsuccessful effort was requesting China for providing nuclear weapons related technology assistance in 1970s. Other unsuccessful attempts for securing nuclear technology required for developing nuclear weapons were made through requesting the former Soviet Union, the United States, Argentina, France, India, Japan, and Pakistan (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011, p.29).

Gadhafi continued the efforts of receiving nuclear assistance from a nuclear state. Eventually, former Soviet Union offered assistance and Libya was

Able to establish a nuclear research reactor at Tajura in 1979 and entered into negotiations with Soviet and French leaders for the establishment of larger reactors (Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011, p28) Libya established contact with A.Q. Khan in 1984, which led to the provision of Libya with gas centrifuge technology (Peter Crail 2008). In the early 1990s Libya and A.Q. Khan reached an agreement for the transfer of P-1 centrifuge technology (Peter Crail 2008). In 1997, A.Q. Khan provided Libya with nuclear weapons design and uranium enrichment (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011, p.29).

In late 1990s Libyan officials offered to dismantle Libya's chemical weapon programs in exchange for relaxing U.S sanctions against Libya. On December 19, 2003, Libya announced that it agreed to fully dismantle its weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons program and accepted immediate and comprehensive inspection from the U.S and IAEA (Sharon Squassoni, 2006, p.1). The Libyan government also committed itself to be in compliance with the NPT, eliminate all ballistic missile beyond a 300-kilometer range, dismantle all chemical weapons and munitions, and enter into the chemical weapons convention. Besides, the Libyan government agreed upon a payment of \$2.7 billion to the victims' families of the Pan Am 103-Lockerbie case (Bruce Jentleson 2006, p.2). The following subsections analyze coercive diplomacy against Libya through four main variables: Demands, Credibility of threats, Sense of urgency, and Regime change.

2.1 Demands

Although the focus of this section is coercive diplomacy against Libyan nuclear program, it is necessary to refer to the Western demands that predated the nuclear demands. The first round of Western demands against Libyan government were related to the Lockerbie case. In the wake of Lockerbie bombing, the U.S and the United Kingdom indicted two Libyan intelligence agents and made a set of five demands (Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock 2006, p. 63). The Lockerbie demands were that Libya had to "(1) surrender for trial the suspects charged with the bombing; (2) accept responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials involved in the bombing; (3) disclose all it knew of the bombing and allow full access to witnesses and evidence; (4) pay appropriate compensation; and (5) commit itself to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups and promptly, by concrete actions, prove its renunciation of terrorism" (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1991). In January and March 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 731 and 748 concerning the Western demands against Libya (YahiaZoubir, 2002). The two Resolutions demanded the Libyan government to hand over the two suspects, co-operate with the investigation team, and compensate the victims' families (UNSCR 731 and 748, 1992).

In the late 1990s the Libyan government approached Clinton Administration for settling the Lockerbie crisis and ending international isolation. U.S under Clinton administration conditioned Libya's complete cooperation in the Lockerbie bomb as a pre-requisite to normalization of U.S –Libya relations. Even after the United Nations lifted its sanctions against Libya, the U.S refused to do so. The U.S under second Clinton administration and first junior Bush administration made it clear that the U.S sanctions against Libya will not be lifted unless Libya dismantles its nuclear weapons program (Jentleson and Whytock 2006, p.71). FlyntLeverett (2004), a senior director on the National Security Council, from March 2002 to March 2003, notes that American negotiators repeatedly told the Libyans "resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of United Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United States sanctions, Libya would have to address... its weapons of mass destruction" (Leverett 2004). The Bush Administration in 2003 stated, "we have long been concerned about Libya's longstanding efforts to pursue nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles" (Squassoni and Feickert 2004, p.2). Thus, despite the demands for the Lockerbie case against Libya, The U.S demand against Libya's nuclear weapons program were made clearly.

2.2 Credibility of Threat

For a threat to be credible, the sender has to possess enough military might for implementing the threat. The U.S unique military position in the world is well known. Thus, the U.S did acquire ample military might for making a credible threat. Also, the previous behavior of the U.S in dealing with states sponsoring terrorism and rouge states in international society would boost the credibility of any threat against Libya. One important caveat is that the U.S during negotiations related to Libya's nuclear program under second Clinton administration and first junior Bush administration never explicitly threatened Libya with a military attack. Instead the U.S relied on imposing economic sanctions –this is discussed in the next subsection: -

Even though the U.S during Clinton and Junior Bush administration did not threaten Libya with a military attack, the Libyan government had plausible reasons for having serious concern regarding the threat of U.S attack on Libya. Up to 2006, the Libyan government was on the U.S list of “States sponsors of terrorism”. In the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S soil, the U.S government employed aggressive actions against states that were believed to support terrorist organizations. The first step was an all-out attack against Iraq, which was one of the states sponsors of terrorism and was believed to be in possession of weapons of mass destruction.

In regard to Saddam's removal by the U.S in 2003 Iraq war and its impact on Libya, President Bush stated, “speaking clearly and sending messages that we mean what we say, we've affected the world in a positive way. Look at Libya. Libya was a threat. Libya is now peacefully dismantling its weapons programs. Libya understood that America and others will enforce [the Bush] doctrine.” (Jentleson and Whytock 2006, p.48) Vice President Dick Cheney consider Libya's concessions on its nuclear weapons program as "one of the great by- products ... of what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan," emphasizing that just "five days after we captured Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammar Qaddafi came forward and announced that he was going to surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States." (Jentleson and Whytock 2006, p.48) Thus, in spite of the absence of a direct and specific military threat against Libya by the Bush administration, the Libyan government seemed to have experienced a great deal of threat from the U.S treatment of other states sponsors of terrorism.

The international community, precisely the U.S was able to create a sense of urgency in Libya for complying with the demands. Multilateral sanctions against Libya sparked an internal economic and political debate and urged the Libyan government for reintegration with international community through complying with the U.S demand. The UN Security Council Resolutions in 1992 and 1993 and the U.S unilateral sanctions had an adverse impact on the Libya's economy (Jentleson 2006, p. 4). Gross domestic product declined 30 percent in 1993 compared to the previous year, economic growth averaged less than one percent from 1992 to 1998, and unemployment skyrocketed to 30 percent (Jentleson and Whytock 2006, p.65). Diederik Vandewalle (2004) argues that “The pragmatism that the new technocrats have urged upon Qaddafi, concern over the economic and political toll of sanctions, and the need for inter- national investment in the country's deteriorating oil infrastructure and in developing new oil fields slowly moved Libya to act upon Western demands”.

In an internal debate on the Libyan economic and political dynamic, Gadhafi stated that “we cannot stand on the way of progress, the fashion now is the free market and investments” (Takeyh 2001, p. 65). The U.S heavy economic sanctions concentrated on oil industry substantially limited the Libyan oil export and by far outweigh the benefits of pursuing nuclear weapons. Moreover, dismantling nuclear weapons program by Libya was the only way for normalizing relationship with the U.S (Carla Anne Robbins 2004). Thus, it was clear that the U.S coercive measure against Libya greatly influenced the Libyan internal political and economic situation and created a sense of urgency among political leaders for complying with the demands.

2.3 Regime Change In Libya

This paper hypothesizes that coercive diplomacy against a nuclear developing/developed state greatly depends on the intentions of the coercer regarding regime change in the target state. The higher the possibilities of regime change in the target state, the less likely the target state to comply with demands and dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The U.S neither tacitly nor publicly called for the regime change in Libya during nuclear negotiations between the two states. Even though regime change was not the agenda of the U.S government, the Libyan government seriously sought for reassurance of regime survival in the event of dismantling its nuclear weapons program. Before the final agreement on dismantling its nuclear weapons program, Gadhafi insisted on further reassurance about policy change and not regime change, saying, “if Libya abandoned its WMD program, the U.S in turn would drop its goal of regime change” (Jentleson and Whytock 2006, p.74). The U.S and Britain through secret talks and other channels reassured Gadhafi that their agenda is policy change not regime change (Jentleson 2006, p. 7).

It is plausible to argue that if the U.S and Britain had not provided assurance of regime survival, more probably Gadhafi would not have abandoned its nuclear weapons program. The fact that the multilateral sanctions devastated the Libyan economy and its oil industry, which is the mainstay of Libyan economy, cannot be questioned. What could be doubted was the Libyan willingness of abandoning nuclear weapons in the absence of assurance for regime survival. Thus, economic sanctions matters in implementing a successful coercive diplomacy against a developed/developing nuclear program, but assurance for regime survival is the determining factor in target state’s decision of abandoning nuclear weapons program. Libya’s case indicates that pursuing regime change can hinder the success of coercive diplomacy and actually be counterproductive. The case shows that what can be achieved by taking regime change out of the agenda. Libya’s decision of abandoning its nuclear weapons program can be considered a great success of coercive diplomacy. Thus, the hypothesis that success/failure of coercive diplomacy in forcing states to forgo developing nuclear weapons greatly depends on the regime survival in the target state is supported by empirical evidences in the Libya’s decision to forgo nuclear weapons program.

3. Coercive Diplomacy Against North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons 2002-2008 Chronology and Background

During the early 1960s, with technical support of the former Soviet Union, North Korea began developing its own nuclear program. Initially, North Korea attempted to

produce plutonium by heavy water reactor plants. In the late 1970s, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors were permitted by Pyongyang to inspect nuclear reactors. Yet, a few years later North Korea attempted to build nuclear weapons development system and convert uranium. In the mid 1980s, the United States alleged to have discovered a secret nuclear

Reactor north of Pyongyang under international pressure, in 1985, North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In the early 1990s, North and South Korea commenced high-level diplomatic talks in pursuance of finding a radical solution for the Korean Peninsula. The two countries signed an agreement on nonaggression, reconciliation, and denuclearization of the peninsula, known as the “joint declaration”. The “joint declaration” came into effect in 1992, forbidding both North and South Korea from pursuing or possessing nuclear weapons. North Korea became the subject of a UN Security Council resolution in 1993, after refusing to permit IAEA inspectors. The bilateral U.S and North Korea talks commenced in 1993, both vowed normalization of economic and political ties and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Quite on the contrary, citing the U.S attempts of suffocating its politics and economy and the usage of the IAEA as a political tool by the U.S, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT and claimed the possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test in 2006, after boycotting the six party talks that had began in 2003 between North and South Korea, the U.S, Japan, China, Russia. After supplying the U.S with substantial information on the Yongbyon reactor and permitting the IAEA inspectors, the U.S agreed to take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea dismantled the Yongbyon reactor in 2007. Tension resurfaced between the U.S and North Korea, North Korea banned inspectors from entering yongbyon nuclear complex and successfully conducted the second nuclear test in 2009.

3.1 Demands

The U.S demands in regard to North Korea’s nuclear program were obvious and specific. The Junior Bush administration in explicit terms demanded complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea through dismantling of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium-based nuclear programs (Larry, Nicksch 2005). The Bush administration linked an immediate North Korean commitment of dismantlement to initiating direct talks between the U.S and North Korea (Larry, Nicksch 2005). Also, the U.S was able to rally international community around its demand of North Korean denuclearization. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 1695, 1718, 1874, and 1985 demanded North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons activities and demanded all UN members to freeze the import or export of materials that could be utilized in North Korean nuclear weapons development (UNSC 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011).

In response to the U.S demands, Pyongyang demanded direct bilateral talks with the U.S, accused U.S of violating the Agreed Framework, and rejected the U.S demand to disarm its nuclear weapons (Gary Samore 2003, p.13). In the first two rounds of six-party talks in 2004 Pyongyang demanded that (I) the U.S has to exclude North Korea from list the U.S list of state sponsors of terrorism, (II) the U.S has to terminate all sanctions against North Korea, and (III) the U.S has to commit itself to supply heavy fuel oil (ByungKoh, 2004). Washington rejected Pyongyang’s demands and insisted

on North Korea's denuclearization before launching direct bilateral talks with Kim Jong II. □

3.2 Credibility of Threat

This paper measures credibility of threat through a considerable disparity in military might between the sender and the target states in favor of the sender and the past behavior of the sender in settling international crisis. The U.S unique military capability in the world is well known. Thus, the U.S did require ample military might for making a credible threat. Also, the previous behavior of the U.S in dealing with states sponsoring terrorism and rouge states in international society would boost the credibility of any threat against North Korea. President Bush in his State of the Union address in 2002, labeled North Korea as one of the three "Axis of Evil" along with Iraq and Iran (White House 2002). Attacking Iraq virtually after one month from the infamous "Axis of Evil" speech, North Korea and Iran were thought to be the next to face an American attack.

Yet, North Korea perceived the U.S threat to lack credibility because of the U.S involvement in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the North Korean military threat against U.S allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. The two countries in the event of a USA military attack against North Korea's nuclear reactors perceived North Korea's threat against Japan and South Korea credible. Japan was seriously concerned about North Korea's Nodong missiles targeted at Japan's big cities that could carry chemical and nuclear warhead (Katsu Furukawa 2003).

Despite Pyongyang's military threat against U.S allies in the region, President Bush disregards Japan and South Korea's concern about Pyongyang's military threat. In a joint press conference with Japanese Premier Koizumi, President Bush clearly stated, "We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea. We will not give into blackmail. We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program" (White House 2003). Thus, President Bush left no room for speculation about the U.S commitment to dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear weapons at any cost. Despite the credibility of the U.S threat, North Korea managed to defy compliance with the U.S demand by preserving a minimum credible threat against U.S allies in the region.

3.3 A Sense of Urgency

North Korea's nuclear ambitions have gained attention of the UN Security Council and vehement criticism at the international level. Isolationist policy that furthered by nuclear ambitions and the cost of building nuclear weapons has further rendered North Korea as one of the most impoverished, underdeveloped, and economically backward countries in the world.

North Korea's nuclear ambition has been the subject of two UN Security Council Resolutions: UNSCR 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). The UNSCR 1718 was unanimously adopted by the members of Security Council under chapter seven that levied a series of economic sanction in the wake of the 2006 alleged nuclear test. The resolution banned imports and exports of "battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery system, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missile or missiles system", froze the overseas assets of individuals and companies involved in

the program, and banned UN members from exporting luxury goods to North Korea (UNSC 2006).

UNSCR 1874 was also adopted unanimously by the Security Council members under chapter seven in the wake of the 2009 nuclear test. Reaffirming the previous resolution, the new resolution imposed further economic sanctions and demanded UN members to search North Korean cargo. It prohibited the member states from providing financial assistance to North Korean nuclear program, or providing loans to the country, except for humanitarian or developmental reasons (UNSC 2009).

According to the October 2010 report of Congressional Research Service, following the implementation of UNSCR 1718 in 2006, financial exposure to North Korea by Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands declined noticeably. Also, following the adoption of UNSCR 1874, North Korean financial exposure dropped from \$1 billion in 2009 to \$46 million in 2010. North Korean access to legitimate trade is dwindling as regional ports in South Korea, Japan, and Singapore no longer receives North Korea-flagged ships (CRS 2010). The two Security Council resolutions dissuaded foreign banks and companies to invest in North Korea.

3.4 Regime Change IN North Korea

The main hypothesis of this paper is that coercive diplomacy against a nuclear developing/developed state greatly depends on the intentions of the coercer regarding regime change in the target state. The higher the possibilities of regime change in the target state, the less likely the target state to comply with demands and dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

Kim Jong Il perceived that the U.S main objective in North Korea is regime change not policy change. Although regime change in North Korea was not on the agenda of Bush administration, there were many reasons for Pyongyang to perceive regime change as the main objective. Washington rejected direct bilateral talk that was proposed by North Korea for resolving nuclear crisis through granting security assurance by the U.S (Samore 2003, p.9). The U.S rejected North Korea's demand of providing security assurance about military attack and regime change unless North Korea dismantled its nuclear weapons program (Niksich 2005, p.13).

A secret document leaked from Defense Secretary of President Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, which was calling for regime change in North Korea (David Rennie 2003). Kim Jong Il's perceptions of U.S regime change policy were emboldened by President Bush's remarks on North Korea's leader. President Bush, in an interview, said, "I loathe Kim Jong Il. I have got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people. And I have seen intelligence of these prison camps – they're huge – that he uses to break up families, and to torture people" (Bob Woodward 2002). It is clear that North Korea's main concern has been regime survival, whereas the U.S main objective has been dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons. In 2000 North Korea offered a simultaneous package of its commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons for an American security assurance of not regime change. North Korea made it clear that if the U.S commits itself to implement non-hostile intent and non-interference in internal affairs of Pyongyang, it is willing to resolve all U.S concern, including nuclear weapons (Chung Moon and Jong Bae 2003, p.14). Yet, Washington

rejected Pyongyang's bid by holding to the principle of "dismantle nuclear weapons first, talk later" (Chung Moon and Jong Bae 2003, p.14).

North Korea's case indicates that pursuing regime change can seal the failure of coercive diplomacy and actually be counterproductive. Pyongyang's decision of preserving its nuclear weapons program can be considered a great failure of coercive diplomacy. Thus, the hypothesis that success/failure of coercive diplomacy in forcing states to forgo developing nuclear weapons greatly depends on the regime survival in the target state is supported by empirical evidences in the North Korea's decision to preserve its nuclear weapons program.

4. Conclusion

This paper focused on determining success and failure of coercive diplomacy against developed/developing nuclear states to forgo their nuclear weapons development. The factors that shape success/failure were analyzed through examining four variables. The four variables, demand, credibility of threat, sense of urgency, and regime change were derived from Alexander George's model. For testing the hypothesis, the four factors were applied to coercive diplomacy against North Korea and Libya. In both cases, the analyses showed that demand was clear, the threat was credible or perceived credible, and the coercer successfully created a sense of urgency in the target state to comply with the demands. Yet, the results of coercive diplomacy in two cases are dissimilar because of the difference in the main independent variable, regime change. In case of Libya, the U.S granted a security assurance to the ruling regime that the agenda is policy change not regime change. Quite on the contrary, the U.S rejected to provide the same security assurance to the ruling regime in North Korea. Libya that was assured of regime survival by the U.S dismantled its nuclear weapons program, yet North Korea that was rejected of regime survival assurance by the U.S, refused to comply with the demands and preserved its nuclear weapons program. Therefore, pursuing regime change in coercive diplomacy against a nuclear developed/developing state is more likely to fail, since the regime will be more vulnerable to a military attack by the coercer in the absence of security assurance of regime survival.

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