

A Critical Account of Dharmakīrti's Exclusion Theory of Meaning

Alok Ranjan Khatua

Research Scholar, Ph. D. Programme, Vidyasagar University, Paschim Medinipore, West Bengal and Assistant Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, Mugberia Gangadhar Mahavidyalaya, (Affiliated to Vidyasagar University, Paschim Medipur, West Bengal, India) Bhupatinagar, Puarba-Medinipur (W.B), 721425, India

Abstract

In the present paper I have tried to explain the Dharmakīrti's view on the Buddhist theory of meaning which is generally known as *Apohavāda*, but technically called as nominalism (the exclusion theory of meaning). Dignāga (c.480-540 A.D), the father of Buddhist nominalism and the great pre- Dharmakīrti Buddhist scholar, maintains nominalism which asserts that universal is not real, it has no reality, only the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) is ultimately real (*paramārthasat*). According to him, word as a linguistic sign cannot refer to the reality; it refers only the method of exclusion or negation of others (*anyāpoha*). Dharmakīrti (c.600 – 660 A.D) accepts Dignāga's notion of *anyāpoha* and the doctrine of *apoha* (the exclusion theory of meaning) and this theory has been developed by him very systematically. He holds that we have no need to admit universal as real entity. Universals are nothing but mere mental constructions which are regarded as mere productions of imagination; they are not external but purely internal. The conceptual knowledge can be expressed by language with the help of the method of exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*). Word as a linguistic sign does not denote the particular; it denotes only thought-image that is excluded from other thought-images.

KEYWORDS: exclusion of others (*apoha*), thought-image (*vikalpa*), mental construction (*kalpanā*), word-meaning, external world, reality.

Introduction:

Philosophy of language is considered as an important branch in Indian philosophy where the theory of meaning has been discussed by almost all the schools of Indian philosophy in different ways such in different ages. In the present paper I would like to present a critical discussion on the Buddhist theory of meaning (*apohavāda*) especially Dharmakīrti's view on import of words which, in Indian philosophy, is known as the exclusion theory of meaning. There are three distinct stages in the development of the *apoha* theory: The negativists like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the positivists like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla,¹ and the synthetists like Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.² According to *apoha* theory, a word cannot directly refer to the real object. So, we can't directly associate with the real object by the meaning of words. The Buddhist *apoha* theory of meaning is generally considered in the field of Indian logic, epistemology, ontology and philosophy of language.

Introduction to *apoha* (exclusion of others):

The etymological meaning of the term "*apoha*" is exclusion, differentiation, separation etc. In Sanskrit, the philosophical explanation of the term "*apoha*" is *apa* + *uha* = *apoha*³ and in English this term means other + exclusion i.e. equivalent to the Sanskrit explanation *anya* + *apoha* = *anyāpoha*.⁴ *Anyāpoha* signifies a logical

method of exposition. *Idam anyasmāt apohyate* (excluded from others), it means A is differentiated from non- A, or non-A from A: *Asmād vā anyād apohyate* (others are excluded from this) i.e. B is differentiated from non- A: *Asmīn vā anyād apohyate* – it means *apoha* may refer to the exclusion itself. John Brough mentioned the term “discrimination” for *apoha*, Dharendra Sharma used “differentiation”, B. P Bhattacharya used “negation” and K. Kunjani Raja used “exclusion”⁵ All of these terms, however, signifies the exclusion of others (*atadvyāvṛtti*).

Dignāga’s double negation theory of meaning:

In the context of Buddhist logic, the concept “double negation” is an important as well as controversial idea which, as Dīnāga puts it in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, is known as *anyāpoha*. For Dīnāga, the concept *anyāpoha* means the exclusion of the contrary (*atadvyāvṛtti*).⁶ Dīnāga, the great Buddhist logician, first introduced the double negation theory of meaning which is based on his very unique notion *anyāpoha*. By the term “*anyāpoha*” he in his celebrated work *Pramāṇasamuccaya* tries to mention the method which is used by him as negation of others (*anyaniṣedha*) and he also applies it to the verbal knowledge (*śabdajñāna*). He believes that *anyāpoha* is the common function of both inferential and verbal knowledge. *Anyāpoha* signifies a logical method of exposition. So, the term “*anyāpoha*” means the exclusion of others (*atadvyāvṛtti*), it is a method of differentiation which can be symbolically expressed as $p = \sim \sim p$. Thus, *anyāpoha* means the negation of opposition. Negation, as Buddhists put it in the *apoha* theory, is nothing other than an indirect way of cognition of something; though it cannot produce any sensation, but gives us produced imagination and it has, therefore, no place in the domain of absolute. In the Buddhist logic negation is of two kinds: one is *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, the simple negation (absolute negation) or the negation of something positive (for example, p is not q or cow is not horse) and other is *paryudāsa*, the special kind of negation or the negation by implication (For example, p implies not-q), it is relative negation. When the Buddhist uses the term “negation”, it stands for exclusion of others or rejection of opposition or contradiction of opposition. Negation, in the Buddhist logic, is an idea or an indirect way (logical method) by which a word refers to its meaning very indirectly or negatively. It is a process or a method which cannot be qualified by the negated object.⁷

In the Buddhist philosophy the unique particular (*svalakṣhaṇa*) is the ultimate real or the thing- in- itself and the universal has no reality, because it is a mere mental construction. Human mind has two cognitive images of an object – one is unique particular (*svalakṣhaṇa*), the other universal (*sāmānyalakṣhaṇa*). These are mutually exclusive to each other. A particular sense- datum (cow) is both *an object of sensation* and *an object of thought* and both are ascribed by the method of exclusion. Dīnāga holds that denotation is not the primary function of language. He used the logical term “*anyāpoha*” (exclusion of others) to explain the *apoha* theory which asserts that an intended object is qualified by negation of other; but it is not mere negation. Here, negation is not the ultimate negation; it is by nature static, so it has no reality.⁸

According to *apoha* theory, the word “cow” can be expressed generally as “cow is not non-cow” or technically (as symbolic logic makes it) expressed as “cow = $\sim \sim$ cow” which can be defined by the Rule of Double Negation such as “ $p = \sim \sim p$ ”. In Dīnāga’s system it is called *anyāpoha* (the double negation theory). In

western symbolic logic it ($p = \sim \sim p$) is simply proved by the truth table method in the following way:

$$p \sim p \quad p = \sim \sim p$$

T	F	T	T	T
F	T	F	T	F

In Nāgeśa's *Paramalaghumañjuṣā* (p.71) two negations mean a possible assertion (*Dvābhyām niṣedhābhyām prakṛity-arthatārdhyabodhanam*.⁹ In the Buddhist philosophy all negations are formulated by the opposition which can be divided into two kinds: Efficient opposition or incompatibility (*Sahabhāva-virodha*) and logical opposition or contradiction (*Anyonyopalabdhiparihāra-sthītilakṣaṇa-virodha*). The former kind of opposition is such type of negation which is determined by the fact that the two sensations exist independently without opposing each other. But their opposition can be opened to us when they exist together in the same time and at the same place in the time-space relation, just as the sensation of heat and cold. The second type of opposition is an opposition of two terms which are logically negated by the method of exclusion. For example, the two terms 'real' and 'non-real' are mutually excluded by the negation of opposition (*anyāpoha*). The contradiction of two facts *blue* and *non-blue* are related by their very essence of opposition by which they are also excluded from each other.¹⁰

Dharmakīrti on Diñnāga's Contribution:

Though the Buddhist scholar Diñnāga introduced the Buddhist theory of meaning, known as *Apohavāda*, yet he, by mistake, made an insurmountable gap between the perceptual realm and the conceptual realm which was not unknown to Dharmakīrti. Now a question may be raised in this context: Is there any bridge for this insurmountable gap between the two realms? In fact, Diñnāga did not take any necessary step to bridge the gap between the two realms, we must wait for Dharmakīrti who tries to solve this problem by introducing a new category of cognition which, to him, known as "perceptual judgment"¹¹ In this connection it needs to be mentioned here that Dharmakīrti gives the clear definition of *svalakṣaṇa* which constitutes the perceptual realm of the ultimate reality by introducing the concept of *arthakriyākāritva* (the causal efficiency). Dharmakīrti admits Diñnāga's nominalism which holds that all except unique particular are mere names or conceptual constructions. Diñnāga used the principle *anyāpoha* to the verbal knowledge which is included under the category of inference, but Dharmakīrti takes a separate position on that ground by saying that the principle of *anyāpoha* is not mere negative principle for verbal knowledge; it is equally applicable to the many problems related to the ontology, epistemology and logic.

Dharmakīrti (c.600 – 660 A.D) appears on the domain of philosophy of language as a next Diñnāga Buddhist logician, but he is distinguished from Diñnāga by taking wide correction of mistake of Diñnāga's theory. In order to develop the *apoha* theory he maintains Diñnāga's concept of *anyāpoha* and introduces the notion of causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) by which unique particular can be defined. In fact, Diñnāga's *apoha* theory is systematically developed by Dharmakīrti, and his work *Pramāṇavārttika* is a thoughtful commentary on Diñnāga's epistemological

contribution *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.¹² The notion *arthakriyāśakti*, as Dharmakīrti puts it, is the unique characteristic of the real thing and it is the causal power of activity for the fulfillment of human desires.¹³ By this concept he wants to draw our attention to the *apoha* theory which, according to his explanation, asserts that word and concept are not able to refer to the object of sensation and they fail to grasp the reality.¹⁴ It is possible to say that from Dinnāga's nominalism we get a new idea about the very nature and function of concepts. In this theory, concept is limited; it has a boundary along with its criterion. The role of concept can be determined only by the method of exclusion.¹⁵

Dharmakīrti's view on the exclusion theory of meaning:

In Indian philosophical tradition there are three positions for scholars who have contributed their thoughts regarding the problems of universals, which are Realists, Conceptualists and Nominalists. Conceptualism and Nominalism are the two forms of antirealism. The Buddhists are generally considered to be nominalists because of their Doctrine of Momentariness or the notion of point instant reality. They are known as nominalists because they deny universals as the real entities, and they admit the reality of particular (the unique particular) against universals.¹⁶

Dharmakīrti admits two kinds of contents of cognition namely *svalakṣaṇa*, the unique particular, the extreme point-instant, and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which is fictional, conceptual construction, object of the inference and not real. He rejects the reality of concepts or universals by arguing that there is a unique relation between words and concepts, both are related to one another for all expressible or conceptual knowledge—but they have no direct relation to the reality. All knowledge, therefore, conceptual or verbal, are relative, they are expressible only indirectly or negatively throughout the import of words. Concepts as nominalists put them in the reduction process are nothing but merely thought-images (*kalpanā*) or mental constructions (*vikalpa*) which never reach the ultimate reality. Because, whatever is causally efficient and unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) by nature is only real – it is beyond the reach of words and concepts.

The Mīmāṃsaka School maintains that the relation between universal and particular “is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference, but identity-in-difference.”¹⁷ But the Buddhist rejects the Mīmāṃsaka theory of universal by asking the question: Is there any universal which is partly identical with particular or partly different from particular? According to Dharmakīrti, the relation between universal and particular is neither identity nor causality, because ‘this relation can neither be a cause nor an effect’¹⁸ Universals are nothing but mere mental constructions, they are not external but purely internal and their difference from particulars (the unique particular or *svalakṣaṇa*) is very often overlooked by us due to our inveterate habits (*anādi-vāsanā*) So, it (universal) has no reality, ultimately it is not considered as a kind of real entity.¹⁹ The distinction between the particular and the universal is unreal; it means this distinction is made by imagination or mental construction. There is no ontological difference between the objects of cognitions or the particular and the universal. Sometimes this distinction is made by us due to our mental constructions or imagination.²⁰ In inference and linguistic expression we are dealing with objects as they are identified or determined by the general terms. Here the question may be raised: what is the function of the general terms or universals? The function of general terms, according to Dharmakīrti, is to determine the self-nature (*svabhāva*) of the objects.²¹ Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika* explains that the

essences of all things are fixed by their own nature (*svabhāva*)²² and they are excluded from other things which are not applicable for this nature. Similarly, universals, as our mental constructions, depend on the objects from which things are to be excluded.²³

It is obviously true that there are some grounds for interpreting the *apoha* theory in terms of nominalism.²⁴ According to the *apoha* theory, the word “cow” can be expressed generally as “cow is not non-cow” or technically (as symbolic logic makes it) expressed as “cow = ~ ~ cow” which can be defined by the Rule of Double Negation i.e. “p = ~ ~ p”. The word “cow” means all that is true of not non-cow; it means that a proposition such as “this is cow” is based on the experience of exclusion of all that is non-cow. In the statement “this is cow” the word “cow” signifies the object as excluded from the non-cow. In this connection Prof. B. K. Matilal rightly says “Exclusion of non-cows is a shared feature of all cows and therefore can very well be the ‘basis’ for the application of the general term ‘cow’.”²⁵

The exclusion theory of meaning also holds that the unique particular (*svlakṣana*) as ultimate real, can’t be denoted by words, because it cannot be determinate by the convention and usage which is a pre-requisite for verbal cognition. But the meaning of word can be determined by the idea of double negation or the method of *anyāpoha*, the uttered speech that we use in our conversation, can’t describe the Real (the extreme point-instant real or *kṣanika*), because Real is beyond human speech. By an uttered word no one eliminates or negates anything, because word does not refer to the total negation .It neither refers to a unique particular nor the universal, because when a word is uttered then particular is not present this time to our eyes as it is presented in our perception. So, whatever is signified by a word is neither a subjective idea nor an objective reality, but something fictitious and unreal which is neither here nor there.²⁶ Dharmakīrti holds that the meaning of a word is purely subjective or conceptual construction; it is not directly related to the external object. Thing or the unique particular is determined by the causal efficiency (*arthakriyā sakti*) or by its essential nature (*svabhāva*),

According to Dharmakīrti, when one uses the perceptual judgment “this is cow”, here the word “this” refers to the unique particular and the word “cow” refers to the thought image (*vikalpa*). The notion of commonness, according to the *apoha* theory, can be explained clearly by the idea of negative commonness. When we use the term “cowness”- it neither refers to the real object (cow), nor refers to the class-cow (universal) in general, but it is only a negation in the form of exclusion of non-cows. The meaning of the word “cow” is equal to the judgment “cow = not not cow” or “not non- cow” or “~ ~ cow”. The judgment “ this is cow” does not describe the universal cow hood of the subject (cow) and the word “cow” does not present the particular ‘this cow’ through the universal, but it presents the particular object only negatively by the method of exclusion of others (*anyāpoha* or *anyaniṣedha*).²⁷

Critical review:

Indeed, the *apoha* theory of meaning is not totally free from objections of opponents. A group of modern scholars of the realistic school of Indian philosophy argue that the *apoha* theory is a mere negative theory of meaning, but the Buddhist scholars believe that it is not a purely negative view of meaning. Uddyotakara would argue that we have a definite cognition of class-character apart from the individual objects. It is obviously true that the general cognition imply the existence of universal. The

external feature (physical shape) of particular object is not the same as a common property. If we regard common property of particulars, then without any doubt it is possible to say that there is universal as real entity.²⁸ If the Buddhist does not admit it then the question is how can our cognition of commonness be possible?

Dharmakīrti's answer is that we have no need to assume the existence of universal for the understanding commonness. Without universals as real entity we can explain the cognition of sameness, the cognition such as 'this is black cow', 'this is white cow,' etc. is not caused by the cognition 'cowness', and it (cognition of sameness) depends on the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*). The cognition of *cowness* (*anugatapatīti*) is determined by the negation of non-cowness. The universal is after all *anyāpoha* (exclusion of others).²⁹ Thus, the universals are nothing but mere mental constructions or imaginary fictions (*kalpita*), because they have no objective reality (*vastutaḥ kalpitatvāt, PVSV, 2.30*).

Kumarīla further argues that the *apoha* theory is not applicable in practical knowledge. The characters of thing as expressed and thing as expressive cannot belong to the two *apohas* (of the meaning and the word respectively), because these, according to the *apoha* theory, are non-entities. For instance, there is no such character which can belong to 'hare's horns' and 'sky-flowers'.³⁰ Dharmakīrti would answer (as mentioned by Kumarīla) that this objection is not practically accepted. Because, we have the inferential knowledge of the *absence* (negation or non-apprehension) of rain from the *absence* (negation or non-apprehension) of clouds (here both these absences are non-entities).³¹ Manorathanandin, the commentator of *Pramāṇavārttika*, clearly and safely concludes that there is, therefore, no obstacle to admit *anyāpoha* as the meaning of a word.³²

Like Dīnāga, Dharmakīrti holds that meaningful linguistic signs do not refer directly to the particulars without mediation of concepts. If the word 'cow', for example, refers directly to the individual cow, then it, which has already been learned and used, would be impossible to use the same word again to denote another one. But the opponent, like the realist, may argue that the denotation of the word 'cow' is not constituted by only single entity or individual, but by all the cows those belong in the class (cowness) and to which the word 'cow' is applicable. But Dharmakīrti does not accept the denotation of general terms; he holds that we, in the case of application of word-meaning in language, have no capacity to identify the all particulars by a single word, even we are not able to know the things what the general terms refer. Whatever is signified by the general term is nothing but mere concept which has no external reality.³⁴

Conclusion:

Dharmakīrti is not only a nominalist but also a resemblance theorist. He rejects general term as referent of real entity and explains general terms as thought-images based on the notion of similarity (*sādṛśya*). He presents his resemblance theory by positing that all concepts are based on similarities from which properties are constructed. He has paid a great attention to the logic, epistemology and philosophy of language, and his contribution to the Buddhist theory of meaning is generally considered in the field of Buddhist logic, epistemology and ontology. For us, it is clear that the Buddhist exclusion theory of meaning (*apohavāda*) is not merely a negative theory of meaning, but it is unique in the domain of Indian philosophy of language. In fact, Dharmakīrti applies the principle of *anyāpoha* (exclusion of

others) very beautifully to the theory of causation in *Hetubindu* which is a sort of working hypothesis and it is equally applicable to many problems of ontology, epistemology and logic.³⁵ In the latter development, the Buddhist scholars Sāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti clearly mention the meaning of the term “apoha” as differentiation and what is intended by the term ‘differentiation’ is neither merely positive entity nor merely exclusion of others, but this term means the positive thing qualified by the exclusion of others (*atadvyāvṛtti*). They believe that the understanding of positive and negative meaning is possible simultaneously. This view was actually concealed in Dharmakīrti’s exclusion theory of meaning.

Notes and references:

1. The following statement of Prof. B. K. Matilal is relevant here: “The issue between the Negativists and the Positivists may be put as follows: For the former, the function of language is negative (exclusion); it does not entail talking about any positive entity such as cow- universal. But the latter point out that the particulars are positive entities and language in some way or other must talk about them it talks about anything.” Matilal, B. K (2001), *The Word and the World: India’s Contribution in the Study of Language*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 39.
2. Katsura, Shoryu (1986) “Jñānaśrimitra on Apoha”, *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Motilal, B. K. & Evans R. D. (eds.), D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.171. See also Mookerjee, S. (1935)., *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Calcutta, , Reprint, Matilal Banarsidas, New Delhi, 2006, P.132.
3. Mishra, R. K (1999). *Buddhist Theory of Meaning and Literary Analysis*. D. K Print World (P) Ltd., New Delhi, op. cit., p. 89.
4. Dharendra Sharma, *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*, The Hague Mouton and Company, 1969. Pp. 28 -29.
5. Mishra, R .K. (1999), op.cit. p. 90.
6. Matilal, B. K. (1985), *Logic, Language and Reality: Indian Philosophy and contemporary Issues*, Motilal Banarsidass Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, Pp. 145-46.
7. Bhattacharya, J. B. (1965) *Negation*, Indian Studies, Past and Present, Calcutta, p. 20.
8. Bhatt, G. P. (1989) *The Basic Way of Knowing: An in-depth Study of Kumarila’s Contribution to Indian Epistemology*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, p. 340.
9. Matilal, B. K. (1985) *Logic, Language and Reality*, op.cit. p. 145 fn.
10. Chattopadhyaya, M.(2002) *Ratnakīrti on Apoha*, Centre of Advance Study in Philosophy, Jadavpur University, in Association with Mahabodhi Book Agency, Kolkata, P. 21.
11. Katsura, Shoryu(1991) “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoha”, *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, Edited by Steinkellner, E; Oesterreiche Akademik der Winenschaft, P.138.
12. Dreyfus, Georges B. J. (1997) *Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations* (Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series No.184), Sri Satguru Publications, A Division of Indian Books Centre, Delhi, P.205; Cf Chattopadhyaya, M. (2002), *Ratnakīrti on Apoha*, P. 30.
13. Phillips, Stephen H. (1987) “Dharmakīrti on Sensation and Causal Efficiency”, *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, p. 240.
14. Phillips, Stephen H. “Dharmakīrti on Sensation and Causal Efficiency”, *op.cit.* Pp.249-50.
15. Chattopadhyay, M. (2002) *Ratnakīrti on Apoha*, op.cit., P. 30

16. Puhakka, K (1994), *Knowledge and Reality: A Comparative*, Motilal Banersidass Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, p. 55
17. Dravid, Raja Ram (2001) *The Problems of Universals in Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banersidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd, Delhi, p. 60.
18. Dravid, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
19. Stecherbatsky, (2008) *Buddhist Logic*, vol. II, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. Delhi, Pp. 418-19.
20. Puhakka, K. *Knowledge and Reality: op. cit.*, Pp. 54-56.
21. *Hetubindu of Dharmakīrti: A Point on Probans*, Trans. by P. P. Gokhale, 1997. Pp. xxii –xxiii.
22. *Sarve bhāvaḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyāvasthiteḥ. Svabhāva parabhāvābhyām yasmād vyāvrttibhāginah. Pramāṇavārttika*, 4. 42. See Ācārya Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, edited by Rahula Sankrityayana, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad, 1943, p.108.
23. *Tasmādyato yatoarthānām vyāvrttisatannivandhanāḥ. Jāivedāḥ prakalpyante tadviśeṣāvagāhinah. Pramāṇavārttika*, 4. 41. See *Pramāṇavārttika: Svārthānumāna Parichcheda* of Ācārya Dharmakīrti, edited by Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya, Benaras University Sanskrit Publication Board, Benaras, Hindu Visvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series No. 2, 1959, p. 16.
24. Gupta, R. (1985) “*Apoha*, Nominalism and Conceptualism”, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, edited by B. K. Matilal, vol.13, No. 4, p. 384
25. Matilal, B. K. (1998) *The Character of Logic in India*, ed. by Ganeri, J. and Tiwari, H., State University of New York Press, p. 104.
26. Mookerjee, S.(2006) *The Buddhist Theory of Universal Flux*, *op.cit.*, p.116.
27. Richard P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, 1988, p. 185.
28. *Nyayavarttika of Uddyotakara* (1915), p. 316; See Dravid, *The Problem of Universals* , p. 74.
29. *arthānām yacca sāmānyasm anyavyāvṛtti lakṣaṇam*, *Pramāṇavārttika*, 2.30; cf. Misra, P. K. (2003) *Śabdārthatattvabindu* , , p.20.
30. Jha, R. N. ed. (2014) *Ślokavarttika, on Apoha*, verse 108, Vidyanidhi Prakashan, Delhi, p.524.
31. *Ślokavarttika, on Apoha*, verse 109, p. 524.
32. *apohaśabdalingābhyām pratipādyate iti bruvatā. PVSV*, 3.134.
33. *sadvitīyaprayogeṣu niranvaya viruddhate*, *PV, IV*, 34; Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*, Pp. 208-9.
34. Dreyfus, (1997), *Recognizing Reality*, *op.cit.* p. 209.
35. Katsura, Shoryu (1986) “*Jñānaśrīmitra on Apoha*”, *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* , P. 172.