

India's National Interests in form of Security Concerns

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Abstract

Foreign policy of a nation is primarily determined by the national interests who are diverse and dynamic. The security concept became comprehensive in the new world order. It included various threats such as terrorism/international terrorism, environmental degradation, ethno nationalism, energy security, human security, translational organised crimes and maritime security. Though, we shall discuss India's Security Concerns: nuclear proliferation in South Asia which mainly pertains to security threats of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan yet we cannot do justice to the study without the study of impacts and interests of super powers like China, USA, Russia etc. in South Asia. Like India have diverse national interests in south Asia. Sometimes we have commonality of interests even with our opponents like Pakistan. When we confined ourselves up to SAARC countries we have numerous commonalities of interests. When India adopts foreign policy of Gujral doctrine India has nothing hostile interests against its neighbouring SAARC nations and India have to play a role of Big Brother without following the principles of reciprocity. Both India and Pakistan have been trying to get the membership of nuclear club and trying hard to get the status of recognised nuclear power by the super powers. We have the common stand on NPT and CTBT. Both have common interests if India successfully gets the gas pipe line supply from Iran via Pakistan. Pakistan is eager to get electricity from India. Pakistan has been working against India when Pakistan transferred some areas like Aksai Chin, Shakasgan valley of occupied Kashmir to China. China helped a lot in providing nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. Earlier USA had the close friendship with Pakistan even supplied the strategic arms supply to Pakistan before Pressler Amendment. But presently U S has tilted towards India when signed civil nuclear agreement 123 in 2007. Even he refused to sign the same treaty with Pakistan. U S is annoyed with Pak on terrorism and concealment of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. U S annoyed with Pak because of supply of nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran. We do feel a combined nexus between US China and Pak when India puts its claim for the permanent seat in Security Council.

To begin with, proliferation issues in South Asia must be understood in context of vertical and horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation takes place as nuclear states modernize their nuclear arsenals with more reliable delivery systems and warheads. Horizontal proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons technology from nuclear states to other entities, including aspiring nuclear weapon states, as well as non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Horizontal proliferation generally involves a significant role for WMD supply networks that may or may not have a connection to official entities in a nuclear state. In the South Asian context, this variant of proliferation is especially pertinent, given the history of the A.Q. Khan network and its assistance to states such as North Korea and Iran.

KEYWORDS: India's Security Concerns, Gujral doctrine, Pressler Amendment, nuclear proliferation, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba

Introduction: The foreign policy of each and every nation is determined by its national interests who are diverse and dynamic in nature. Amongst the diverse national interests security concerns are foremost significant for a nation. The present paper deals with diverse national interest of Indian foreign policy. The paper prominently deals with national interests of India in form of 'Security Concerns.' The security concept became comprehensive in the new world order. It included various threats such as terrorism/international terrorism, environmental degradation, ethno nationalism, energy security, human security, translational organised crimes and maritime security. These non traditional threats are a great challenge to peace and security and can best be tackled by collective global efforts but still the traditional security threat that safeguarding one's sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be ignored. Nations are spending ever increasing amount to enhance their military strength and technological breakthrough to seek superiority in war. Hence amongst all national interests who have their significances in themselves, security concerns are paramount significant for a nation because these relates to the very existence of a nation. As deterrent the nuclear proliferation is prominent for the security of a nation. The proliferation though it is difficult to develop which requires huge amounts as well as scientific and technical innovations yet the difficult task keep its technology secret. If the danger cropped up that the technology may be provided to dangerous terrorist outfits that are against India that danger can pose a serious threat to India. The paper deals with all these issues.

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Though, we shall discuss India's Security Concerns: nuclear proliferation in South Asia which mainly pertains to security threats of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan yet we cannot do justice to the study without the study of impacts and interests of super powers like China, USA, Russia etc. in South Asia.

Like India have diverse national interests in south Asia. Sometimes we have commonality of interests even with our opponents like Pakistan. When we confined ourselves up to SAARC countries we have numerous commonalities of interests. When India adopts foreign policy of Gujral doctrine India has nothing hostile interests against its neighbouring SAARC nations and India have to play a role of Big Brother without following the principles of reciprocity. Both India and Pakistan have been trying to get the membership of nuclear club and trying hard to get the status of recognised nuclear power by the super powers. We have the common stand on NPT and CTBT. Both have common interests if India successfully gets the gas pipe line supply from Iran via Pakistan. Pakistan is eager to get electricity from India.

Sino-Indian differences are considerable on issues relating to the non-proliferation system, Asian security, regional stability in Southern Asia, and security in the maritime commons, space, and cyberspace. The two rising powers broadly agree on matters relating to the international economic system, energy security, and the environment. Both India and China have number of border disputes and claims and counter claims on certain areas. China has been abetting and aiding left-wing Maoists extremists in India to weaken its internal cohesion and to use them in case of conflict with India. China in Tibet has been constructing a dam on Brahmaputra River which will restrict the flow of water to Indian Territory. During 2012, there was an attempt made by the BRICS nations to reform the current system of representation inside the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the last G20 meeting in Los Cabos (Mexico) in June.

China and India tend to agree on the importance of state sovereignty and the need to reform global governance institutions to reflect the new balance of power. They also share a strong commitment to the open economic order that has allowed both powers to flourish in the global marketplace. But the two diverge on many details of the international system, such as the future viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the role of state-owned enterprises in fostering globalization.

Both China and India want a stable Asia-Pacific that will allow them to sustain their economic prosperity, but they perceive threats very differently and have divergent priorities. Importantly, India seeks a resolute American presence in the region to hedge against possible Chinese excesses, while China sees the United States as significantly complicating its pursuit of its regional goals and worries about American containment attempts.

China and India rely heavily on open sea lines of communication, and as a result, they both support the current maritime security regime. However, their interpretations as to its provisions have occasionally diverged. In space, China enjoys significant advantages over India and has emphasized the military dimensions of its program, while India has only recently begun developing space-based military technology. Both countries are just beginning to wrestle with the difficult task of forming cyber security policies, but they have already acted to limit objectionable or illegal activities online. In striking the balance between online freedom and social stability, India has encountered a higher degree of disgrace in the public sphere than its counterpart.

Chinese and Indian approaches to both energy and the environment broadly converge. Because India and China face a rising domestic demand for energy, they heavily rely on foreign suppliers of energy resources. This has prompted both governments to seek more efficient power sources and to secure their presence in overseas energy markets. On environmental policy, the two countries focus on primarily local and short-term concerns that must be balanced with the need for economic growth.

India has diverse and dynamic interests with USA who has been playing a vital role in the region. India and US have commonality of interests when both consider international terrorism is the greatest challenge to world peace even both are working together to fight out the threat of terrorism. Both are closely working together to check the enhancing dominance of China in south Asia. U S is also watching closely the Sino-Pak friendship ties. The friendship of China and Pakistan has been working against India when Pakistan transferred some areas like Aksai Chin, Shakasgan valley of occupied Kashmir to China.

China helped a lot in providing nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. Earlier USA had the close friendship with Pakistan even supplied the strategic arms supply to Pakistan before Pressler Amendment. But presently U S has tilted towards India when signed civil nuclear agreement 123 in 2007. Even he refused to sign the same treaty with Pakistan. U S is annoyed with Pak on terrorism and concealment of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. U S annoyed with Pak because of supply of nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran. We do feel a combined nexus between US China and Pak when India puts its claim for the permanent seat in Security Council. The three have close nexus when we get some military and technological aid from Russia. Pakistan has strong intention to make Muslim nuclear bomb to terrorise Israel. U S and India have close ties with Israel and Pakistan has close ties with Arabs. In the prevailing era of imbalance of powers tilted towards US who are termed sometimes uni-polar/ uni-polar with multi centrality world, India, Russia and China jointly clandestinely trying to create balance of powers again. Hence the diverse and dynamic national interests of India, Pakistan, China, Russia creates a complex atmosphere in South Asia which pose a serious security concerns for South Asia in general and India in particular.

Two recent reports—Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds by the US National Intelligence Council, and US Strategy for a Post-Western World: Envisioning 2030 by the Atlantic Council—give a clear indication that 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the world is under a new form of global governance. Although Washington remains the only superpower in the world, US hegemony has declined globally. New centres of political power have emerged in new economic centres which are gradually developing in Asia and Latin America.

Today, Asia could return to have a leading role, especially thanks to the rise of China and India at a regional and global level. This has already resulted in a paradigm shift in the US foreign policy which is more focused on the Asia-Pacific region. China is emerging as a leading global power and represents the most important country in the world in manufacturing, production and commerce. As an emerging economy, India, too, is set to become an important centre in the new emerging multi-polar world order.

To begin with, proliferation issues in South Asia must be understood in context of vertical and horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation takes place as nuclear states modernize their nuclear arsenals with more reliable delivery systems and warheads. Countries including the United States, China, India, and Pakistan, are in the process of modernizing their arsenals through actions such as proposals for "a reliable replacement warhead" (as in the case of the United States). In the context of South Asia, nuclear modernization is mainly a function of prevailing threat perceptions arising from security dilemmas. Modernization of arsenals includes the development and testing of longer-range missiles—such as the tests of the Agni-I V by India, and the Shaheen-II by Pakistan.

Horizontal proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons technology from nuclear states to other entities, including aspiring nuclear weapon states, as well as non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Horizontal proliferation generally involves a significant role for WMD supply networks that may or may not have a connection to official entities in a nuclear state. In the South Asian context, this variant of proliferation is especially pertinent, given the history of the A.Q. Khan network and its assistance to states such as North Korea and Iran. In addition, horizontal proliferation includes second-tier proliferation, where developing countries trade and barter nuclear technology with each other. While vertical

and horizontal proliferations are variants of the proliferation dynamic, it is entirely possible that a nuclear state (such as Pakistan) could make use of non-state networks in the pursuit of nuclear modernization.

Historical Perspectives

South Asia is one of the most populated regions of the world, with India and Pakistan alone accounting for about 1.35 billion people. Both countries have been bitter rivals since partition of the subcontinent in 1947 that led to the creation of independent Pakistan and independence for India. The two countries have fought two wars over Kashmir (1947, 1965), one over East Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971), one limited war (Kargil, 1999) and the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir (since 1989). The 2001-2002 crises further highlighted the dangers of terrorist violence provoking a conventional conflict that could lead to a nuclear crisis. Kashmir, which lies at the heart of the dispute, is more than a simple territorial problem. The province has a Muslim majority, and for India it is a symbol of its secular credentials as well as a repudiation of the partition, which was based on religion. For Pakistan, Kashmir is crucial because it is seen as an unfinished agenda of partition, which was supposed to provide a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslim community. Thus, Kashmir is an integral part of both countries' perceived self-identities.

Since the 2001-2002 crises, Islamabad and New Delhi have conducted several rounds of peace talks aimed at bringing a lasting settlement to the Kashmir issue. This peace process has involved several confidence-building measures such as strengthening of transport links between the two countries. The two sides also signed a crucial agreement on reducing the risk of nuclear accidents in February 2007. Nevertheless, the key dispute, Kashmir, is nowhere near resolution. This implies that both New Delhi and Islamabad are more inclined toward strengthening existing military capabilities, both conventional and non-conventional, to prevent an unfavourable scenario in a future standoff.

Furthermore, the Siachen glacier is also a region of military significance. The glacier, to the north of Kashmir, commands a strategic overlook of the small border between Pakistan and China and can potentially be used as a point of attack on India from northwest Kashmir. The glacier became a battle ground between the two armies in April 1984 and despite repeated talks, there has been no movement toward demilitarization. The complex rivalry between India and Pakistan involves territorial disputes based on notions of national identity as well as terrorist violence.

Sino-India Relations and Security Concerns

The role of China in South Asian security issues as well as in future conflict scenarios is crucial when considering two realities-(a) the historical animosity between India and China, and (b) the long standing 'all-weather' political and military alliance between Pakistan and China. Indian analysts often cite transfer of nuclear and missile technology from China to Pakistan as evidence of an encircled threat to India like 'string of pearls'. (1) Through nuclear and missile technology transfers to Pakistan, Beijing restricts India to the South Asian strategic framework, and this constrains New Delhi's stated desire to seek a more global presence. From the Chinese political establishment's perspective, the concern is over India's defence expansion, its desire and movement toward a stronger regional and global role, and its increasing strategic connections with US.(2)

At the same time, the present threat perceptions between India and China are not the same as between India and Pakistan, which are more immediate and based on a 'hot' territorial dispute and state-sponsored terrorism. Nevertheless, analysts in India have long pointed to Chinese military modernization as a coercive threat to India. This modernization includes missile development, such as the current deployment of the DF-21 and DF-3 missiles in Qinghai and Yunnan provinces.(3) Furthermore, there is some suspicion among Indian analysts that though Beijing's stated policy is that of minimum deterrence, the stationing of missiles such as DF-3 and DF-21 reflects a posture of nuclear coercion, and under some conditions, does not preclude a first strike against its neighbours.(4) It is also possible that since 1998, Beijing may have deployed nuclear weapons on the Tibetan plateau in response to a perceived Indian conventional military advantage and the May 1998 nuclear tests. Thus, despite growing trade between the two sides, there is some degree of unease in India over China's long-term intentions, more so in light of predictions of increased competition between the two countries for global energy resources. The concern in India is that if bilateral relations take a negative turn at some point in the future, China's current military modernization will give China a significant advantage.

Terrorist Groups as a threat to Security Concerns in India

As aforementioned, nuclear weapons development and enhancement in South Asia are intricately related to long-standing rivalries between the concerned states. However, instability does not just stem from the risk of nuclear warfare between states in the region. Non-state actors also play a significant role in the nuclear security framework, aside from their role in facilitating nuclear proliferation. First, terrorist groups (such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba) that are connected to the Pakistani religious-political establishment can provoke tensions between India and Pakistan through mass casualty attacks. This was amply demonstrated following the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Jaish-e-Mohammed militants, which led to a ten-month stand-off between the two armies.

A second danger is through a Kargil-style episode in which militants, in cooperation with official Pakistani agencies and the military, occupy territory in Kashmir. As the July 2007 siege of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) complex in the heart of Islamabad showed, militant groups are steadily expanding their geographical area of influence, adversely affecting the stability of Pakistan. Although the nuclear weapon complex is under military control, there might be pockets within the military that are sympathetic to fundamentalist groups. At the very least, political and religious instability in Pakistan creates uncertainty in the minds of policymakers within and outside the region.

Finally, fears have been heightened since 9/11 over the possibility of nuclear weapons technology transfers from Pakistan to terrorist networks, especially after it was revealed that some senior Pakistani nuclear scientists met with the Al Qaeda leadership prior to 9/11. A related concern in the aftermath of 9/11 is that a fundamentalist Islamic group with Taliban/Al Qaeda links could take over Pakistan and with it, possession of the country's nuclear arsenal. Thus, Indian (as well as U.S.) threat perceptions include not just bilateral nuclear stability issues between India and Pakistan, but also the consequences of nuclear technology and materials falling into the hands of militant groups.

In general, the complex nuclear weapons scenario in South Asia is shaped by two main factors. First, the intense nature of the dispute between India and Pakistan strikes at the very

core of their nationhood. It involves territorial disputes and terrorist violence, and is further complicated by the desire of some terrorist groups to acquire non-conventional technology. Second, South Asia is part of a broader nuclear weapons context that includes China and the United States. Military developments by either Washington or Beijing, which are perceived as a direct threat, also impact military policies (both conventional and non-conventional) in South Asia. At the same time, the continued strategic military collaboration between China and Pakistan (such as the joint development of the JF-17 fighter plane) is a factor that motivates India to continue nuclear and conventional modernization. Furthermore, while the territorial disputes between India and China are relatively dormant, there is no final resolution. As developments in 2006-2007 demonstrated, there is still a considerable gap between the two sides on the territorial issue.(5) Due to this combination of factors, there are no clear incentives for either party to drastically reorient its nuclear policy.

Nuclear Proliferations in South Asia

Keeping the various security disputes and attitudes in mind, the next step is to consider the nuclear doctrines and policies of protagonists in the region. Both India and Pakistan strive for a minimum deterrent. The objective of India's nuclear strategy is credible minimum deterrence (CMD), meaning a secure and reliable second-strike capability after absorbing an adversary's first strike. The main potential targets of this projected deterrence capability are Pakistan and China. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine also seeks a credible deterrent, against India, and according to one senior nuclear weapons planner, its weapons are "aimed solely at India. In particular it seeks to deter New Delhi from launching a conventional military attack such as an offensive for limited war objectives, including destruction of terrorist training camps, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities.

For both India and Pakistan, key components of their attitudes in nuclear defence demonstrate the incompatibility between their mutual nuclear postures. India's offer of a no-first use pact has been rejected by Pakistan as nuclear weapons are an integral element of its (Islamabad's) defence doctrine. On the other hand, Islamabad has offered New Delhi a no-war pact, which ostensibly would reduce the prospect of full-scale conventional war and the risk of nuclear crises. However, such a proposal does not touch upon the proxy war waged by the Kashmiri militants and therefore has been rejected by New Delhi. (6)

Thus, both India and Pakistan strive for a secure second-strike capability as an integral element of their credible minimum deterrent doctrines. Since, neither side has constructed systems that are deemed completely satisfactory and reliable, nuclear modernization continues. For India, this means a survivable delivery mechanism that can conceivably strike major cities in China. At present the longest range deployed missile is believed to be the Agni-IV with a range of 3,500-4,000 km, and can reach parts of western China.

This implies that for the foreseeable future, the Indian scientific-military establishment will reinforce their commitment to adequate delivery systems, especially the Agni III and the nuclear submarine project (the Advanced Technology Vessel or ATV) that could carry a sea-based deterrent in the form of a submarine-launched cruise missile (the Sagarika-currently under development).Russia had agreed to lease two nuclear submarines to India under a package deal for the retrofit of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier which has already handed over to India in December 2013. India is about to receive Nepra submarine.

As stated earlier, Pakistan's deployed missile systems can reach most parts of India. These deployed missiles include the Ghaznavi (Hatf-3, range 290 km), Shaheen-I (Hatf-4, range 600-800 km), and the Ghauri-I (Hatf-5, range 1,500 km). Development is also taking place on the Shaheen-II (Hatf-6, range 2,000-3,000 km), which was successfully tested in February 2007. These missile developments illustrate Pakistan's desire for a more secure deterrent, once the range issue had been dealt with. In addition, Pakistan is also seeking a more secure second-strike capability through the acquisition of the Agosta 90B class submarine in late 2007. This vessel, the second to be added to Pakistan's navy, can carry the nuclear capable Harpoon cruise missiles.

Both countries have also achieved considerable progress in manufacturing another delivery system-cruise missile. India, in partnership with Russia, has developed the BrahMos, while Pakistan has the Babur. These missiles are meant to have land, sea, and air versions, and at least in the case of the BrahMos, will also have a variant for export. In the near future, Indian defence planners hope to introduce land attack cruise missiles with the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead over 1,500 km.(7) In addition, submarine and air force versions of the BrahMos are due to be tested in 2007. The missile is also being installed on ships and IL-38D maritime reconnaissance aircraft to give "strategic relevance" to the Indian Navy. Similarly, Pakistan has successfully tested its nuclear capable Babur (Hatf VII) cruise missile (range 700 km) in March 2007.(8)

In sum, in order to strengthen their nuclear delivery capabilities both India and Pakistan are seeking to perfect their missile arsenals, both ballistic and cruise. The dynamic nature of the pursuit of more reliable deterrence capabilities is also affected by strategic developments involving extra-regional actors, especially China and the United States.

Conclusion

Hence India has a very serious security concerns in South Asia vis a vis Pakistan, China and militant organisations (such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba). The security concerns are multi dimensional. The India has traditional enmity with Pakistan and China. Both Pakistan and China have close military and economic ties. China has provided nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. Both Pakistan and China pose a serious security threats for India. China being a super power, having veto power in UN, having advanced nuclear and missile capability, economically strengthen, technologically and industrially advanced than India pose a real threat to India. But the biggest threat is militant organisations having the nuclear capability without any responsibility and no danger to existence poses a vital security threat to India because militants do not have any limitation like nations. Perhaps India without the close relations with US, Japan, Taiwan, Philippine, etc cannot be in a position respond to the serious security threats posed by Pakistan, China and militant organisations.

Foot notes:

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